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In most cases the purpose of a limited liability company is to serve the financial inter-
ests of its shareholders. Therefore, the purpose of the company and the distribution of 
assets, the latter being the theme of this thesis, are key issues in companies and also 
closely linked to each other.  
In accordance with Article 15(1)(a) and (c) of the Second Company Law Directive 
(77/91/EEC), i.e. the so-called Capital Directive, under the old Finnish Companies Act 
(734/1978, Chapter 12, Section 2) the distribution of profits might not exceed the total 
profit as confirmed by the profit and loss statement for the fiscal period and the compa-
ny’s other reserves of unrestricted equity less the loss shown in the profit and loss ac-
count and the amount which under the Articles of Association was to be transferred to a 
reserve fund or otherwise left undistributed. This proviso to the distribution of assets, 
e.g. a payment of a dividend or a stock repurchase from a shareholder, is called a bal-
ance sheet test, and it was held in the new Finnish Limited Liability Companies Act 
(624/2006, hereinafter: FCA). In addition, one of the main innovations of the FCA was 
the regulation of the distribution of assets partly in a new way: a so-called solvency test, 
was adopted, as follows: “Assets shall not be distributed, if it is known or should be 
known at the time of the distribution decision that the company is insolvent or that the 
distribution will cause the insolvency of the company” (FCA Chapter 13, Section 2). 
According to FCA Chapter 13, Section 5, unless otherwise ensues from the application 
of Chapter 13, Section 2, the company may distribute its reserves of unrestricted equity, 
less the assets that are to be left undistributed under the Articles of Association. In the 
Finnish Government Bill regarding the FCA (109/2005) it is stated that the content of 
the present Act Chapter 13, Section 5 corresponds to the provisions of the old Act. The 
solvency test must be fulfilled at the same time as the balance sheet test in order for the 
assets to be distributed (Jokinen 2008, 95−96). 
As to auditors, prior to the new FCA, an auditor was obliged to express one’s view 
on the asset distribution. However, under the FCA this is to be done if an asset distribu-
tion breaches the provisions of the FCA. In the case of solvency test, the problem is that 
the meaning of solvency is not overtly spelled out in the FCA or in its travaux prepar-
atoires. It is therefore important for an auditor to be alert in such situations to avoid 
liability, but auditors are left somewhat alone in defining such a situation in which a 
reaction is needed. 
Even if some time has elapsed since the adoption of the FCA, only a few sporadic 
analytical and comprehensive writings and articles have been published on this very 
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theme. Thus, the role of the auditor in this context in Finland remains somewhat un-
clear, and at best the view is incomplete. To the best knowledge of the author, no previ-
ous study on this topic has provided a comprehensive coverage of the auditors’ view on 
this theme (cf. Ruohonen, 2012). There are only some master’s theses and short presen-
tations (Markkola 2009; Markkola and Sutinen 2011a and 2011b) that have discussed 
the issue. At the master’s theses level, Lehtimäki (2010) discussed the definition of sol-
vency and interviewed two authorised auditors on their view on the definition, on 
whether the auditors had faced difficult situations in this context and on how they had 
reacted to the problems that had arisen. 
In May 2009, the Finnish Ministry of Justice published a short description of the sta-
tus quo and a proposal for the amendment of the aforementioned provision (See: Finn-
ish Ministry of Justice 2009a). I had the honour to be part of the working group, whose 
description and proposal, however, met critique from many interest groups (See: Finn-
ish Ministry of Justice 2009b). Hence, also the situation was left unchanged and as am-
biguous as before. Yet, that assignment gave me a spark to become even more interested 
in the theme. 
1.2 Objective and scope 
This thesis is about a regulatory institution, audit, which can be defined as follows (Por-
ter, Simon and Hatherly 2008, 3, adapted from the definition provided by the Commit-
tee on Basic Auditing Concepts, 1979, 8): 
 
“Auditing is a systematic process of objectively gathering and evaluating evidence 
relating to assertions about economic actions and events in which the individual or or-
ganization making the assertions has been engaged, to ascertain the degree of corre-
spondence between those assertions and established criteria, and communicating the 
results to users of the reports in which the assertions are made.”  
 
The audit does not develop in a vacuum, but it is shaped by the surrounding society. 
Understanding the changing needs of society, e.g. the solvency test in the asset distribu-
tion, and their effect to the audit are important research objectives (Carmichael 2004, 
128; Janvrin and Jeffrey 2007, 296). Therefore, with the aid of existing literature and 
Finnish authorised auditors the aim of the current thesis is to find out how they position 
themselves with regard to the corporate governance framework and new legal setting 
after the adoption of the new FCA. In this thesis I will concentrate on the role of the 
auditor in the context of solvency test in asset distribution in Finland. I will consider a 
standard audit in accordance with the Finnish law and International Standards of Audit-
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ing (hereinafter: ISA) and point out how the applicable provisions are related to the as-
set distribution. To my knowledge, such extensive coverage has not been made before. 
In addition, my main focus will not be in the discussion of the meaning of solvency test 
as a financial test or as a legal test since it has been discussed rather extensively in the 
Finnish literature.  
In the accounting literature it has been stated that there is little information available 
about the corporate governance factors that influence the actual audit process. Moreo-
ver, the auditor work has been described as a black box (cf. Cohen, Krishnamoorthy and 
Wright 2002, 580; 2010, 754). Thus, probing with questionnaires and semi-structured 
interviews are some of the few manners to deepen understanding regarding the auditors’ 
work (See: chapter 1.3, below).  
As to the focus of the study, I will exclude the audit of a group in this thesis because 
of the limited space available and because it does not bring any added value to the the-
sis, as the solvency in the context of asset distributions is considered in one company 
alone, not in a group. Even if the solvency test is nowadays applicable in many other 
Finnish enterprise forms than limited liability companies, for instance in cooperatives 
and housing companies, I will not concentrate on them specifically because of their spe-
cific characteristics. In essence, their legal nature as so-called mutual companies leads 
to accounting treatment of profits and dividends that differs materially from limited lia-
bility companies. However, the results of this study may be applicable in those enter-
prise forms, too, on the condition that due attention is paid to the specific characteristics 
of those enterprise forms. 
1.3 Method 
In this thesis I have chosen to employ a combination of existing literature (secondary 
data) and a survey (primary data). Thereby, the literature with regard to legal provisions 
and established standard auditing practices are connected to the survey on the practices 
regarding asset distribution. 
I have decided to employ the survey as a contrast to the fact that Lehtimäki (2010) 
has interviewed two Finnish authorised auditors on the theme. I have assumed that a 
more comprehensive view on the topic could be obtained by sending out an electronic 
survey directly to all the Finnish authorised auditors. This research choice has required 
access to individuals yet unfamiliar to me, and for this purpose, I have asked the Finnish 
Institute of Authorised Public Accountants (KHT-yhdistys, hereinafter FIAPA), the 
registered association representing the authorised auditors in Finland, to mediate the 
survey to all their member auditors. Moreover, I have agreed to maintain anonymity of 
the respondents and confidential treatment of single answers. Theoretically, FIAPA has 
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been a gatekeeper (Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008, 53−55), as the alternative research 
method of sending paper questionnaires or even electronic mail by myself to all the 
Finnish authorised auditors would have been a true burden for this kind of study. I am 
thankful for the positive response and aid of FIAPA.  
As to the online survey, it has limited the research to those individuals that have ac-
cess to the relevant information technology (IT) and competence, time and motivation 
in using it. However, I have assumed that the absolute majority of auditors have access 
to the internet, and that does not pose a hinder to the study as such. Also I have taken 
account of that online research allows the respondents to participate in the study when it 
is suitable to them as regards the time and place of responding to the survey as well as 
when they otherwise feel comfortable of doing that (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008, 
103). The problems involved with the online survey may have been that the respondents 
may have faced a lack of motivation, distrust in confidentiality or other kind of distrac-
tion, and lack of authorisation from the audit firm or a third party (Eriksson and Ko-
valainen, 2008, 106). 
For this thesis I have set up a topic-related electronic Webropol survey (See: Appen-
dix 1). Questions of the studies by Janvrin and Jeffrey (2007), Cohen, Krishnamoorty 
and Wright (2002 and 2010) and Lehtimäki (2010) were used as an example for the type 
and model of the survey. Preliminary questions were set up by me, and they have been 
pretested and commented in spring 2014 by one practising yet unauthorised junior audi-
tor, who, at that time, was a student majoring in accounting and finance at Turku School 
of Economics, University of Turku, and by one practising authorised auditor. The pre-
liminary questions were slightly adjusted on the basis of the comments given by these 
professionals before sending the final set of questions. A cover letter and an open link to 
the survey were sent out on 27 May 2014 to all the Finnish authorised auditors mediated 
by FIAPA. Notwithstanding the contents of the answers, there were no further control 
mechanisms for controlling that a respondent de facto was an auditor. The survey was 
closed on 20 June 2014. The timing was planned to be such that it could be fairly possi-
ble for a willing auditor to respond to the survey, that is, to not be open at the busiest 
reporting period or the Finnish midsummer fest holiday, and to give sufficient time to 
respond. 
The aim has been to obtain a representative view on whether the auditors themselves 
consider the solvency test important, on whether they have faced difficult situations that 
have demanded action from their side, and on what kind of actions have they taken in 
these situations. No information having a link to, e.g. the management, business opera-
tions or future plans of the audit firms was asked. A starting point for the study has been 
that the results of the survey may be applicable also in practice. When it is exposed how 
the auditors in general perform the evaluation on the matters of solvency, this infor-
mation can be also applied by other auditors as they face a similar situation. 
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1.4 Main sources and the degree of authority 
The European audit law is based on the previous, now partly abolished audit directives, 
and on the 8
th
 Company Law Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits of annual ac-
counts and consolidated accounts, amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 
83/349/EEC and repealing Council Directive 84/253/EEC (the Audit Directive). 
The Audit Directive includes, among other things, provisions on the application of 
international auditing standards, meaning the ISAs and related Statements and Stand-
ards (Article 26, paragraph 2). In accordance with the Audit Directive, the Member 
States shall require statutory auditors and audit firms to carry out statutory audits in 
compliance with international auditing standards adopted by the Commission in accord-
ance with the procedure referred to in Article 48(2) (Audit Directive Article 26, para-
graph 1). Yet, the Commission has not adopted a single international accounting stand-
ard (Mähönen and Villa 2010, 414), and the national audit standards apply. In the Finn-
ish Auditing Act (459/2007, hereinafter FAA) it is provided, in essence, that it is man-
datory to comply with the ISAs in a statutory audit (FAA Section 1, Subsection 1, and 
Section 13). In other audit tasks the ISAs are nationally construed to be a part of the 
good auditing practice (FAA Section 22; Mähönen and Villa 2010, 414). 
In this thesis, unless otherwise is mentioned, the references are made to the interna-
tional ISAs of year 2010 established by the International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board (IAASB), except for revised ISA 315 that is effective for audits after 
15 December 2013, governed under the International Federation of Accountants 
(IFAC), and not to the nationally adjusted standards. Moreover, the auditors are bound 
to follow the professional Code of Ethics Professional Accountants by the IFAC Ethics 
Standards Board for Accountants (Government Bill 194/2006, 41; Mähönen and Villa 
2010, 415). 
Since the directives oblige the Member States, it is necessary to include the direc-
tives, their implementation in the national legislation and the ISAs in the references of 
this thesis. In addition, since audit law is closely related to company law, company law 
directives and national company law provisions need to be referenced as well. The 
aforementioned sources of information are legally binding. 
As to the Finnish literature on audit practice, I will use mainly two books: Riistama 
1999 as well as Halonen and Steiner 2009. International perspective to these themes is 
mainly given by Arens, Elder and Beasley 2014. Regarding topics related to the Finnish 
company law, the two main references are Airaksinen, Pulkkinen and Rasinaho 2010a 
and 2010b and Mähönen and Villa 2006, 2010 and 2012. Also law and audit-related 
journals have been referred to in this thesis. These books and journal articles carry only 




In this first chapter I have explained the general background and the fundamental choic-
es that I have made regarding research design. The structure hereafter is as follows:  
In chapter 2 the solvency test will be shortly discussed. I will consider it as a finan-
cial test and as a legal test under the FCA. In chapter 3 I will introduce the general cor-
porate setting in which auditors conduct their work. I consider it necessary to describe 
shortly whose interests auditors generally further and why auditing is needed. In chapter 
4 the foundations of audit, i.e. objectives and procedural framework of a regulatory au-
dit assignment, are explained. Chapter 5 covers the auditor’s duties in a statutory audit. 
The approach in this chapter is based mainly on the ISAs, but in this chapter I point out 
only those standards that are relevant with regard to the asset distribution. Chapter 5 
also constitutes a basis for chapter 6, in which I will describe the specific tasks of an 
auditor in the context of the asset distribution. I will show that even if auditing a solven-
cy test was not made by the company, auditors do take it seriously. In chapter 7 I will 
provide the results of the survey and take up some of the most important results for dis-
cussion. Chapter 8 summarises the topics covered in this thesis and includes final con-
clusions and caveats related to this thesis. At the end of the thesis the readers can find 
the survey that was sent to the Finnish authorised auditors. The correlation tables that 
have been obtained as a result of the survey are also annexed.  
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2 SOLVENCY TEST IN THE CONTEXT OF ASSET 
DISTRIBUTION 
2.1 General 
The solvency test is not based on the Capital Directive but on the national legislation. 
The test has proved difficult to interpret because the FCA and the Government Bill 
109/2005 do not specify clearly what is meant by solvency. Therefore, one could argue 
that multiple perspectives could be taken. In the following I take the view that the sol-
vency test could be seen from a financial point of view and from a legal one. 
It is rather a widely accepted view that the financial position of a company consists 
of four main factors: growth rate of the company (Laitinen and Laitinen 2004, 261) as 
well as profitability, liquidity and solvency (Blummé, Kaarenoja and Suontausta 2010, 
42−45). Each of these main factors can be evaluated on the basis of the financial state-
ments that result also in key financial indicators or ratios. Two main problems seem to 
be involved with these indicators and ratios in the context of the thesis: 1) too often, 
however, various economic indicators supporting solvency analyses are reported, but 
neither are the background assumptions of these indicators presented nor is their appli-
cation to the solvency test of the FCA justified. Thus, there is a risk that economic ar-
guments may implicitly be transferred to research and practice even if they are not 
openly presented. 2) What is more problematic is that the company law aspect compris-
ing director’s due care has received very little consideration in theory (See: Jokinen 
2007 and 2008).  
2.2 A financial test: profitability, liquidity and solvency and their 
economic indicators 
Financial statements and annual report. Solvency is often evaluated on the basis of the 
latest financial statements by the managers and by the auditors (cf. chapter 7, Questions 
9 and 10). This is appropriate if the data is still valid on the condition that the circum-
stances at the moment of the financial statements still prevail despite the events that 
have occurred after the setting up of the financial statements (Government Bill 
109/2005, 125). Where commentators have supported the use of the financial state-
ments, they have paid attention to amounts of some key items therein, such as income, 
equity and cash flow. For example, Koski and Sillanpää (2014) highlight the importance 
of unrestricted equity and other voluntary equity reserves, of which the latter are based 




Key indicators, ratios and other financial information. When evaluating solvency, the 
Government Bill 109/2005 does not exclude other sources of information.  For example, 
in addition to the financial statements, as the sources of solvency assessment Mähönen 
and Villa (2012, 388−389, 416−420; 2010, 422) consider all the available information 
concerning the company’s financial position. In particular, they enumerate company’s 
most recent quarterly report, cash flow statement and key financial ratios concerning 
funds flow, liquidity and financial solidity. The auditor must evaluate the situation as a 
whole. Hence, the evaluation cannot be based only on one indicator in the financial 
statements. Airaksinen et al. (2010b, 45–46) underline the information from the finan-
cial statements noting, however, that not all companies are obliged to prepare the cash 
flow statement. It is necessary only when there is a specific reason to do so, such as a 
doubt on the development of the solvency in the future.  
It is worth an observation that the growth rate is not explicitly mentioned in any of 
these writings even if it is mentioned by Laitinen and Laitinen (2004). Also, it is to be 
remembered that the management and auditors may also face serious time pressures in 
performing their duties (See: Otley and Pierce 1996), which leads to that some selection 
of data must be made. 
 
Solvency models. Kähkönen (1998, 36−38, 104−107 and 129−130) has modeled a sol-
vency test, but this has been done in order to assess the fulfilment of criteria provided 
for in Finnish Criminal Code (39/1889) Chapter 39, Section 1 (dishonesty of debtor). 
This mathematical model is a combination of property reserves at time 0 and the incom-
ing and outgoing cash flows at time period between time 0 and 1. The key finding of the 
test is that it should be done with the same criteria prospectively and retrospectively. 
Otherwise the initial financial situation before a transaction cannot be genuinely com-
pared with the resulting financial situation after the transaction. Moreover, he requires 
that the mathematical model shall be valid, reliable and relevant in order to be useful. 
As I see it, these qualitative traits distinguish this model from all other evaluation crite-
ria and models in the academic domain. 
In addition, Blummé et al. (2010, 126−128) have developed their own model with 
regard to the distribution of assets. The solvency test is, in essence, composed of three 
elements: 1) estimating the company’s present financial situation, 2) the future pro-
spects and 3) risks. They emphasise the importance of the development of the compa-
ny’s finance and an accurate forecast of the future, e.g. predictions regarding the result, 
balance sheet and cash flow, cash budget as well as other plans. They consider that the 
following need to be taken into account: 1) standard adjustments of operating earnings 
in the financial year, such as deductions of extraordinary items,  2) earnings in relation 
to the planned amount of distribution of assets, 3) equity ratio, 4) payment behaviour, 5) 
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quick ratio, 6) significant events after the end of the financial year or in past years that 
have an effect in the future earnings, 7) ability to generate profit, 8) sufficiency of cash 
flow after the planned distribution of assets, 9) possibilities to realise assets not neces-
sary for the business and 10) threats and liabilities in the near future. The situation with 
regard to solvency is then analysed and categorised either as non-critical, critical or 
something in between those categories.  
 
Going concern testing (See in more detail: chapter 5.2.6, below). Troberg (2009) has 
stated from the point of view of an auditor that the assessment of solvency is close to 
the assessment of going concern, the assessment of which is governed by ISA 570. He 
also notes critically on the studies regarding bankruptcy prediction that no detailed defi-
nition of insolvency exists and will not exist. 
Markkola (2009) opines that, in addition to the aforementioned key financial items 
and ratios, the following factors can be taken into account in measuring solvency: Prod-
ucts and markets payment behaviour, financial position, financial forecasts by the com-
pany, cash flow plans, forecasts of need for debt and equity financing, valuation of bal-
ance sheet items, risk assessment and management, related party transactions, litigation 
and legal procedures, threats and liabilities, and other factors. Attention shall also be 
paid to the company’s realistic ability to obtain cash or other liquid assets in order to 
pay the liabilities as they become due. For example, financing may be obtained from 
other companies in a group. Yet, the procedural requirements are the application of the 
going concern principle, due care, and appropriate documentation. He has also pondered 
upon whether the auditor is the guarantee of appropriate asset distribution: there seems 
to be three conditions for that role. First, when the auditor evaluates the legality of pro-
posal for an asset distribution, the proposal shall be based on the financial statements 
that the ordinary general meeting of the audited company may adopt. Second, the bal-
ance sheet test is used to calculate the distributable amount of unrestricted equity. Third, 
the solvency test is used to complement the balance sheet test. In performing these du-
ties, the auditor shall comply with ISA 315, 320, 330 and 570 (Markkola and Sutinen 
2011b, 3−5 and 6−7). 
2.3 A legal test: director’s due care 
It is generally acknowledged that the purpose of a company is to generate profits for the 
shareholders. However, articles of association may include a stipulation that a given 
company may have another purpose (FCA Chapter 1, Section 5). The management of 
the company shall act with due care. The duties also include the promotion of the inter-
ests of the company (FCA Chapter 1, Section 8). The problems of the FCA, the Gov-
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ernment Bill 109/2005 and the jurisprudence culminate especially in the question on 
what is meant by director’s duty of care in the distribution of assets. The management 
referred in the said provision includes the members of the board of directors, and the 
possible managing director and/or the possible members of the supervisory board (FCA 
Chapter 6, Section 1, Subsection 1). The section on the duty of care and loyalty applies 
to the actions of the company management specifically in this capacity. The manager’s 
personal way of dealing with his own matters is not relevant (Government Bill 
109/2005, 40−41). 
The duty of care falls into two parts, the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. In gen-
eral, the duty of care requires the management to take active procedures to further the 
best interests of the company and, thus, indirectly that of the shareholders. The compli-
ance with the duty of care is evaluated from an objective point of view of a prudent per-
son, that is, how such a person would have acted in a like situation (Government Bill 
109/2005, 40).  
In running a business active decision-making and risk-taking constitute an inherent 
part of the life of the management. When assessing whether the duty of care is observed 
to a sufficient degree, attention is paid to the fact that in business some decisions must 
be frequently taken while uncertainty prevails. The more important or risky a certain 
decision is, the more the due care is emphasised. Sufficient diligence can generally be 
deemed to be that appropriate background information for the decision or other action 
has been acquired. It is also required that on the basis of such information a consistent 
decision or other measure has been taken. Further, the management shall not have been 
influenced by conflicts of interest when making a decision (Government Bill 109/2005, 
41). Under these conditions, a breach of the duty of care occurs where a certain decision 
or other action is omitted when it should have been reasonably taken, for example, to 
proceed to collection of payments or to bring a matter before a court. The duty of care is 
evaluated on the basis of the information available and the conditions prevailing when 
the decision or action is made, not in hindsight (Airaksinen et al. 2010a, 47). 
The duty of loyalty is closely related to the purpose of the company and to the equal 
treatment of shareholders (Airaksinen et al. 2010a, 48). The management shall act only 
in the best interests of the company to maximise the net value of the company, and the 
duty of loyalty requires that conflicts of interest shall not influence the management’s 
decision-making or other actions. The managers cannot pursue their own interest or 
further the interest of certain shareholders or group of shareholders, even if a certain 
manager has been appointed by certain shareholders (Government Bill 109/2005, 41). 
The management’s duty of loyalty is unilaterally binding only on the management and 
is unconditional (Mähönen and Villa 2006, 116 and 121).  
According to Keay (2005, 616–620, 629, 633–635 and 638), in the distribution of as-
sets the board of directors must also take into consideration the interests of the debtors 
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collectively, since distribution of assets always carries the risk of debtors losing their 
outstanding receivables. The rights of the shareholders must not be ignored at a time of 
impending insolvency, but the interests of all interest groups should be balanced in such 
a way that in the long term the value of the entire business unit and not merely the equi-
ty is maximised. Thus the board should avoid excessive caution but also reckless risk-
taking in the interest of the shareholders. This could be seen as an expression of the en-
lightened value maximisation principle that aims at balancing the positions of the inter-
ested parties in the short and long term (Jensen 2001, 309−310), now acknowledged 
also in Europe (Mähönen and Villa 2006, 84−85 with references). 
As to the general duties of the management bodies in Finland, the board of directors 
shall take responsibility for the administration of the company and organise its opera-
tions and the control of the company accounts and finances appropriately. The manag-
ing director shall take responsibility for the executive management of the company, and 
the managing director shall obey the instructions and orders given by the board of direc-
tors. The managing director shall also be responsible for that the accounts of the com-
pany are in compliance with the provisions of the accounting law and that its financial 
affairs have been arranged in a reliable manner. The managing director also gives in-
formation to the board of directors, where necessary (FCA Chapter 6, Sections 2, 17 and 
21; ISA 200.4). A duty to give out standardised financial information constitutes an 
incentive to the management to fulfil its fiduciary duties, that is, to run the operations of 
the company in accordance with its objective and provide distributable profits to the 
shareholders. By standardising this financial information and by rendering its estab-
lishment obligatory the transaction costs are reduced, as contractual provisions to this 
effect are not needed (Mähönen and Villa 2010, 318–319 with references). 
With regard to the distribution of assets, where the board of directors considers that 
the distribution can be decided, the annual report shall contain a proposal for the use of 
the profits of the company. This applies also to a proposal, where appropriate, for the 
distribution of other unrestricted equity (FCA Chapter 8, Section 5, Subsection 2). The 
board of directors must evaluate the financial position on the company in accordance 
with the duty of care and loyalty.  
Decisions on the use of the profit shown on the balance sheet shall be made at the or-
dinary general meeting (FCA Chapter 5, Section 3, Subsection 2). Usually the general 
meeting does not exceed the proposal of the board of directors. However, the general 
meeting has the authority to do so if it is under the obligation to do so under section 7 
(on minority dividend) or the articles of association (FCA Chapter 13, Section 6, Sub-




3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE ROLE OF         
AUDITORS 
3.1 The theory of the firm and corporate governance: the theoreti-
cal background 
In neoclassical economics a firm is considered to be a black box where an input enters 
into the firm and an output exits the firm to the markets. Nothing else is visible to the 
interested parties. Although firms seek to maximise their profit, the neoclassical ap-
proach focuses on aggregate firm behaviour, the markets (Romano 2010, 1).  
However, in the 20
th
 century the focus of interest has shifted towards the company 
and its bodies. Berle and Means (1932) noted that the ownership rights were to a de-
creasing degree in the hands of those who manage the firm, that is ownership and con-
trol had been separated. They also understood that active ownership becomes passive, 
and the interests of the owners and the actions of the managers are not necessarily 
aligned. Later on, with regard to property rights, Coase (1960, 15−19) realised that, in-
stead of transactions being costless, there are always costs involved in carrying out 
market transactions to transfer the property rights. He understood that the production 
costs of the firm would in many cases diminish, that is, the firm would function more 
cost-efficiently, when the firm operates as an organised firm and not solely through the 
markets. He also noted that the rearrangements of rights are not based on contracts but 
on administrative decisions.  
Jensen and Meckling combined the theories of Berle and Means to that of Coase. The 
firm is simply one form of legal fiction. The firm serves as a nexus for contracting rela-
tionships where the interested parties make divisible residual claims on the assets and 
cash flows of the organisation which can generally be sold without permission of the 
other contracting individuals. The firm is a reflection of a complex process in and dur-
ing which the sometimes conflicting goals of interested parties are brought into equilib-
rium (Jensen and Meckling 1976, 311). 
Jensen and Meckling also analysed the conflicting interests of the parties to the firm. 
The manager of a wholly-owned firm makes all the operating decisions and maximises 
one’s profit and wealth and also enjoys all the benefits of non-pecuniary activities. If the 
owner-manager sells equity claims on the firm, the buyers cannot find out ex ante how 
the owner-manager will behave after the purchase is closed. Agency costs will be gen-
erated by the divergence between the interests of the owner-manager and those of the 
outside shareholders. Prospective minority shareholders may realise that the owner-
manager’s interests will not be in symmetry with their own interests. As a consequence 
of this uncertainty and agency costs, the prospective buyers are willing to pay a lower 
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price for their shares. The price reflects the monitoring costs and the effect of the diver-
gence between the manager’s interest and theirs. The more the owner-manager’s frac-
tion of the equity falls, the more his fractional claim on the outcomes falls, which en-
courages him to use more corporate resources to the perquisites. As a result, the minori-
ty shareholders are willing to monitor more the behaviour of the owner-manager (Meck-
ling and Jensen 1976, 311−313). Thus, minority shareholders become principals and the 
owner-manager becomes an agent to the principals. 
In practice, conflicts of interest are typical to the agency relationships because the 
principal and the agent tend to act in pursuit of their respective self-interest, and usually 
it is not possible to monitor the actions and the omissions of the agent. Contracts define 
the rights and duties of each principal and agent in the organisation, the evaluation crite-
ria of the agent’s performance and the applicable remuneration system (Fama and Jen-
sen 1983, 302). However, like any business, the contracts concerning corporate owner-
ship and management are incomplete, and the conclusion of a complete contract is usu-
ally not possible or it is extremely costly (See: Coase 1963, 16−17). The agency prob-
lems in companies arise not only because of contracting costs and but also due to moni-
toring costs. The principal is usually unable ascertain whether the agent is dishonest and 
whether the reason for the agent’s non-optimal result is the agent’s breach or some other 
external factor. The agent has always more private information about the performance 
than the principals (information asymmetry) both before the agency relationship is es-
tablished (adverse selection) and even during it, enabling the agent to take advantage of 
the situation (moral hazard) (See: Akerlof 1970, 488−492 and 495−496). Moreover, 
between agents there are conflicts of interests which necessitate the establishment and 
enforcement of costly contracts (Fama and Jensen 1983, 302 and 304). 
It is important to notice that monitoring problems of similar nature arise also in rela-
tion between shareholders, creditors and professional management (Shleifer and Vishny 
1997, 737). In the agency relationship between the shareholders and creditors, in a lim-
ited liability company it is in the interests of shareholders to demand a compensation for 
their equity investment to the company. According to the traditional view, the share-
holders receive all residual earnings generated by the company after all the fixed non-
residual charges are paid to the creditors, such as employees and providers of the com-
pany (Kraakman et al. 2009, 35−36 and 115). From the creditors’ point of view, the 
limited liability of shareholders constitutes a risk because the shareholders may appro-
priate the assets of the company at the cost of the creditors. The creditors require relia-
ble financial information about the financial state of the company simply because the 
creditors need to evaluate the amount of that risk (Mähönen and Villa 2010, 312). The 
creditors play a dual role depending on the financial status of the company: Under nor-
mal circumstances, the creditors are only counterparties to transactions with the compa-
ny. As counterparties, the creditors may run the risk of opportunistic behaviour by the 
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company and the shareholders. If, however, the company fails to provide a timely pay-
ment to the creditors and becomes bankrupt, the creditors then become the owners of 
the remaining assets of the company. As a bankruptcy creditor, a creditor may run the 
risk of opportunistic behaviour by other bankruptcy creditors. Hence agency risks of 
one creditor may vary considerably over the company’s existence (Kraakman et al. 
2009, 115–116). This dual role, in particular the bankruptcy scenario, needs to be kept 
in mind when distributing assets out of the company, since the management and share-
holders are not allowed collude in order to harm the interest of the creditors. 
In the agency relationship between shareholders and the professional management, 
the principal, i.e. the shareholders, delegates some, but usually not all, of the manage-
ment and monitoring duties to the agent, i.e. the board of directors. The board of direc-
tors, in turn, delegates some, but not all, of its duties to other secondary agents. As pro-
fessional managers take over the management of business from the shareholders, to 
counter the risk of moral hazard the shareholders require information about the conduct 
of the professional managers. The managers become accountable to the shareholders 
(Halonen and Steiner 2009, 13−15). The directors and managers should further the re-
sidual interests of the shareholders acting in accordance with due care and loyalty, even 
in the choice of the applicable accounting standards (FCA Chapter 1, Section 5, and 
Chapter 6, Sections 2 and 17; Mähönen and Villa 2006, 75 with references, 92 and 107). 
However, the principal’s information about the efficiency of the agent does not equal 
the agent’s information, which leads to a situation that the principal is dependent on the 
information given, limited and potentially manipulated by the agent. The directors and 
managers have an opportunity to further their own interests at the cost of the sharehold-
ers. The principal cannot, however, ascertain himself of the validity of the information 
given by the agent, which is the main reason for conducting the audit. Therefore, ac-
countability of the agent towards the principal is the theoretic background to audit (Hal-
onen and Steiner 2009, 13−15). 
3.2 The role of the auditors in mitigating the agency problems  
As a consequence of the separation of ownership and control, the directors and manag-
ers need to report to the shareholders and other interested parties. The public sector 
completes contracts, which have been concluded between stakeholders of limited liabil-
ity companies, through regulating the financial statements and audits. These provisions 
on financial statements reduce information asymmetry related to the corporate agency 
relationships (Mähönen and Villa 2010, 311 with references).  
The interested parties need to assure that the financial statements can be relied on 
(Porter et al. 2008, 9). Shareholders universally employ auditors to verify accounting 
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disclosures (Kraakman et al. 2009, 128). Therefore the auditors should provide a high 
quality audit in order to fulfil the expectations of the shareholders and other interested 
parties. The audit enhances the control of the conflict of interests among different stake-
holders, and at least the firm characteristics i.e. leverage, firm size, ownership structure 
and number of accounting-based debt covenants, and the breadth of information asym-
metry render it more probable that an external auditor is employed (Chow 1982, 
273−277 and 287; Mähönen and Villa 2010, 312; Niemi, Kinnunen, Ojala and Troberg 
2012, 189). The auditors act as agents while the shareholders act as main principals. 
This general view is now provided for in the FCA according to which the general meet-
ing shall appoint the auditor. The same can be said about all listed and public companies 
in the Member States of the European Union (FCA Chapter 7, Section 2, Subsection 2; 
the 4
th
 Company Law Directive 78/660/EEC, Articles 11, 12 and 51; European Com-
mission 1996, 23). Also, the auditors act as the agents of creditors even if the creditors 
do not usually play any role in the selection of the auditor unless otherwise agreed. 
There is, however, some evidence to the claim that the some sizeable financial institu-
tions require in their debt covenants that Big Four audit firms must be used to verify and 
report on the financial statements (cf. European Commission 2010, 16; Christodoulou 
2010, 2). 
An audit duly conducted by an independent auditor, who is free from the manage-
ment’s influence, can fulfil the shareholders’ and creditors’ demand for verification. 
There are several reasons why an external verifying party is an efficient solution to 
overcome the reporting problems. First, there may be a conflict of interest while the 
management is setting up the financial reporting. A company’s financial statements are 
prepared under the supervision of its directors who, in fact, report on their own perfor-
mance (Porter et al. 2008, 10). The information may be biased in favour of the infor-
mation provider who can be either too optimistic or fraudulent (Arens et al. 2014, 27). 
Second, the information receivers may be remote from the firsthand knowledge of the 
financial information or they may not have access to it due to legal, physical or econom-
ic constraints (Porter et al. 2008, 10). It would be also economically inefficient to for all 
users to verify the information individually (Arens et al. 2014, 27). Third, the number 
and complexity of transactions has increased in recent years. Therefore the users are less 
able and prone to evaluate financial statements by themselves (Porter et al. 2008, 11; 
Arens et al. 2014, 27), and use auditors instead. The relationships among different par-
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Figure 1. Relationships among auditor, client and external users (Arens et al. 2014, 28, 
transformed to an Excel broadsheet by the author). 
An audit is a control mechanism, which reduces the costs of opportunistic behaviour 
and increases the overall value of the audited company (Jensen and Meckling 1976, 323 
–324).  Audited financial statements are considered to give stakeholders a positive sig-
nal about the validity of information, which is likely to enhance stakeholders’ confi-
dence and willingness to contract with the audited company (Cadbury Report 1992, 39). 
In addition, it is in the interest of shareholders that the company maintains its operative 
competitiveness, discharges of its obligations to creditors and acts in accordance with 
the applicable legislation. In this way benefits accrue to different stakeholders while the 
value of the company increases (Hirvonen, Niskakangas and Steiner 2000, 116–117; 
Alakare, Koskinen, Reinikainen, Sedig and Simola 2008, 17).  
The necessity of the audit can also be justified not only in the protection of the pri-
vate but also that of public interest, which includes the protection of minority share-
holders and creditors (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 17). Therefore, the audit as an institu-
tion serves a more general, societal function. (See: FAA Section 20; Government Bill 
194/2006, 41; Handbook of the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants 100.1 and 
100.6; and Halonen and Steiner 2009, 33). To be able to serve multiple and sometimes 
conflicting interests, an auditor shall also be objective and to act with professional com-
petence and due care. According to the principle of objectivity, the auditors shall not 
compromise their professional judgment because of bias, conflict of interest or the un-
due influence of others. In accordance with the principle of professional competence 
and due care, the auditor shall maintain their professional knowledge and skill at the 
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required level so that the clients receive competent professional service. The auditors 
shall also act diligently in accordance with applicable technical and professional stand-
ards when they perform an audit (IFAC Code of Ethics 120.1 and 130.1−130.5). Based 
on these duties, FIAPA has given out its own standards that are binding on the Finnish 
KHT- and HTM-auditors (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 33−36). 
Compliance with such requirements is of the essence, as recent negative examples 
prove. Based on the theory of audit firms’ incentives and threat of costs incurred due to 
a change of a client, DeAngelo (1981, 184) has claimed that the larger the audit firm, 
the better the quality of the audit. However, in the wake of a series of defaulting audits 
in the early 21
st
 century, the reputational constraint, which refers to that it would be irra-
tional for auditors to act improperly, is not deemed to hinder the auditors from deviating 
from the requirement of objectivity when the accounting treatment is less than certain. 
Accordingly, in the described circumstances the auditors may impair their objectivity 
and agree with managers’ disclosures even if such disclosures deviate materially from 
the information that the auditor has obtained in performing audit procedures (Mayhew, 
Schatzberg and Sevcik 2001, 49−50 and 66). Problems may relate to decision-making 
biases and heuristics, to short-term cultivation of client relationships critical to career of 
key auditors, and/or to obtaining competitive advantage over second-tier audit firms 
(Prentice 2006, 785−786 with its references) and the long audit partner engagement 
tenure, alumni affiliation and the level of non-audit services sold (Ye, Carson and Sim-
nett 2011,  145).  
Auditors may even breach their professional duties even in a flagrant fashion and 
simultaneously enable an illicit distribution of assets. For example, in the United King-
dom Deloitte advised MG Rover Group and one of the partners of Deloitte acted simul-
taneously as de facto corporate finance advisor to four shareholder-managers, known as 
the Phoenix Four, of MG Rover Group. The Phoenix Four first conducted a manage-
ment buyout of MG Rover Group and later paid themselves large bonuses before col-
lapsing. It was found before the tribunal that both Deloitte and its partner failed to take 
into account the public interest, identify their true client, identify conflict of interests, 
act in the interest of their client, consider and put in place adequate safeguards between 
the Phoenix Four and MG Rover Group, act according to Fundamental Principles and 
safeguard against self-interest. As a consequence, the respondents were severely fined 
and the partner was excluded from the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England 
and Wales, ICAEW, for 3 years (See: FRC Tribunal Report 2013; The Telegraph 9 Sep-
tember 2013). 
Thus, in order for an audit to decrease agency costs and to provide more certainty to 
the decision-making shareholders and creditors, the principals have to be able to trust 




4 OBJECTIVES AND PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK OF A 
REGULATORY AUDIT ASSIGNMENT 
4.1 Overall objectives according to the FAA and ISA standards 
In the FAA certain companies are obliged to have an auditor but it is silent about the 
overall objective of the audit, i.e. how and why an audit is performed. However, the 
overall objective and its scope are clearly stated in the ISAs: The auditor shall, first, aim 
at obtaining reasonable assurance that the financial statements do not contain a material 
misstatement (See: chapter 4.4 on materiality, below). The auditor must make an overall 
assessment of the financial statements. Such a misstatement may be caused by a fraud 
or an error. Second, relying on the results of due audit procedures, the auditor should 
then have the ability to communicate an opinion to the readers of the auditor’s report if 
the financial statements are established, in all material respects, complying with the re-
quirements set in the applicable financial reporting framework. Third, keeping in mind 
the accountability towards one’s principals, the auditor should report on the financial 
statements and communicate one’s results consistently with the findings that the auditor 
has made (ISA 200.11). Reasonable assurance is a high level of assurance, but it is not 
absolute in the sense that the auditor can hardly be absolutely certain that the financial 
statements contain zero misstatements. Assurance that all the items in the financial 
statement were correct would render the audit overly expensive and time-consuming, 
virtually impossible (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 44). There are always inherent limita-
tions in performing an audit, and they relate to the nature of financial reporting and au-
dit procedures, and the time- and cost-budgets of a given audit. As a consequence, the 
majority of the documents, that the auditor obtains as audit evidence during the audit 
and on which one’s opinion is based, is persuasive. The audit evidence is therefore not 
of conclusive nature (ISA 200.5 and A45). Further, there is always a risk that some rel-
evant piece of information is hidden from the auditor and such information may not be 
detected. That is why it is underlined that the auditor’s opinion neither assures the future 
viability of the company nor the efficiency or effectiveness of the management’s con-
duct in running the business (ISA 200.A1).  
The FAA only states what the general scope of the audit is: “an audit covers the audit 
of the accounting records, the financial statements, the annual report and the administra-
tion of a corporation or a foundation” (FAA Section 11, Subsection 1). As to the report-
ing of auditor’s findings, an auditor must issue an auditor's report for each financial pe-
riod. The auditor’s report shall be dated and signed (FAA Section 15, Subsection 1).  
Business processes and financial reporting always involve risks and items, which the 
management has to accept. It is the duty of the management to reduce such risks by the 
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use of sufficient internal controls, but it cannot mitigate those risks completely. The 
management functions under business-related uncertainty, and therefore the establish-
ment of financial statements necessitates management’s professional judgment as it ap-
plies the applicable financial reporting standards in the situation in question. Instead of 
some interpretation being outright right or wrong, numerous acceptable interpretations 
or judgments that may be available to the managers in a given situation. Consequently, 
some financial statement items or the fair values are subject to inherent variability, and 
the auditor faces identical problems regarding the degree of uncertainty related to the 
use of professional judgment. The degree of uncertainty may not be mitigated by per-
forming additional auditing procedures (ISA 200.46; Halonen and Steiner 2009, 44).  
The aforementioned risks affect the work of an auditor. The auditor is expected to 
obtain a view about the corporate environment and the efficiency of the internal control 
and to execute relevant measures in order to obtain sufficient audit evidence. In particu-
lar, the auditor shall consider the reasonableness of the accounting estimates and the 
qualitative aspects of the company’s accounting practices, including indicators of possi-
ble biases in management’s judgments or a fraud (ISA 200.A46−A47; Halonen and 
Steiner 2009, 42−44). 
4.2 The objective of auditing the statements that constitute the fi-
nancial statements 
One of the objectives of the financial statements is to provide a calculus for the distrib-
utable amount of assets. According to Riistama (1999, 151), the profit, which can be 
distributed without diminishing earning power, i.e. profitability or finance of the com-
pany, is distributable. Riistama also makes a remark that a deficit is a decrease of the 
amount of equity and earning power. As profitability and finance are key issues to the 
company, the audit should include the analysis of these matters.  
As to the profit and loss statement, the following general objectives could be men-
tioned: 1) the profits and expenses are accounting-based, 2) all the profits and expenses 
of the financial period are recorded in the profit and loss statement in accordance with 
the good accounting practice so that they produce a true and fair view to the users; 4) 
the profits and expenses are timely accrued, which is to say in the correct period; 5) the 
profit and loss statement is established using the same methods and principles that were 
used in the previous financial period, or at least material changes in these methods or 
principles are reported in the notes to the financial statements; 6) the differences in the 
results of external and management accounting can be explained in a reliable manner  
(Riistama 1999, 161−162).  
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As to the balance sheet statement, the abovementioned general objectives apply. In 
addition, the auditor shall see to that the money, the accounts receivable and the assets 
and liabilities exist. To reach this objective the auditor may conduct, for example, an 
inventory inspection. Also the auditor shall assure that notes to the financial statements 
and other specifications fulfil the requirements provided for in the accounting legisla-
tion (Riistama 1999, 176−177). In particular, with a view to the distribution of assets, 
auditing the items of equity and liabilities is important. As to the equity, the following 
must be audited: 1) changes in the share capital information entered in the trade register; 
2) entries regarding the use of profit or loss in the previous financial period. Share capi-
tal shall be recorded in the balance sheet in accordance with the FCA, the articles of 
association and the FAA and the guidelines of the Finnish Accounting Board. As to the 
liabilities, the balance of each liability account in the subledger shall match with the 
corresponding account of the general ledger. The short and long-term liabilities shall be 
distinguished, and it shall be reported if the long-term liabilities include an item that 
becomes due no earlier than five years. Also, the external confirmations of balances 
shall be verified. Moreover, subordinated loans, their conformity with the conditions 
provided for in the FCA and recording in the balance sheet statement shall be audited 
(Riistama 1999, 194−195 and 200−202).  
As to the annual report, it is noteworthy that the auditor is not obliged to give an ex-
plicit opinion about the management’s assessments about the future. As to the cash flow 
statement, where it is established, the auditor shall assure, first, that it is established in 
compliance with the FAA and the guidelines of the Finnish Accounting Board. Second, 
as the cash flow statement is established to inform interested parties about the amount 
and sufficiency of revenues, outgoing distributions, investments and capital structure, 
the auditor should keep these general objectives in mind and consider whether sufficient 
information is given. In addition, the cash flow statement aids management and inter-
ested parties in anticipating future cash flows (Riistama 1999, 223−226). 
In sum, the auditor must obtain understanding of the operative result and the finan-
cial position and compare it with the objectives of setting up a given statement. In per-
forming analytical audit procedures, the auditor takes advantage of key financial ratios 
and immerses oneself with the cost-revenue structure in the profit and loss statement. 
The auditor may compare the numbers of the financial statements with those of previous 
financial years and establish other key reference numbers or calculations. The auditor 
should try to find reasons in the real process for changes in the financial statements 
(Riistama 1999, 174−179). Auditing the profit and loss statement and the balance sheet 




4.3 Audit risk and its components 
The overall objective of the audit is to reduce the risk of material misstatement in the 
financial statements to an acceptably low level. By definition audit risk is “the risk that 
the auditor expresses an inappropriate audit opinion when the financial statements are 
materially misstated”. Two kinds of problems, frauds and errors, may cause material or 
non-material misstatements in the financial statements. Usually a fraud is intentional 
and an error is unintentional (ISA 200.5, 13(c) and A47). Intentional misstatements re-
sulting from fraudulent financial reporting and misstatements resulting from misappro-
priation of assets are of relevance in the audit. Of these two fraudulent acts, the misap-
propriation of assets is more commonly seen (ISA 240.3 and A5). 
Audit risk is “a function of the risks of material misstatement and detection risk” 
(ISA 200.13(c)), e.g. an unqualified auditor’s report is not appropriate where the finan-
cial statements include a material misstatement and the auditor does not notice it nor 
report it (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 45). 
Detection risk is “the risk that the procedures performed by the auditor to reduce au-
dit risk to an acceptably low level will not detect a misstatement that exists and that 
could be material, either individually or when aggregated with other misstatements” 
(ISA 200.13(e)). The auditor reduces the detection risk through efficient audit proce-
dures. 
The risk of material misstatement consists of two components: (i) inherent risk, i.e. 
“the susceptibility of an assertion about a class of transaction, account balance or disclo-
sure to a misstatement that could be material, either individually or when aggregated 
with other misstatements, before consideration of any related controls”, and (ii) control 
risk, i.e. “the risk that a misstatement that could occur in an assertion about a class of 
transaction, account balance or disclosure and that could be material, either individually 
or when aggregated with other misstatements, will not be prevented, or detected and 
corrected, on a timely basis by the entity’s internal control” (ISA 200.13(n)). It is not 
usual for the ISAs to refer to inherent risk and control risk separately. Yet, the auditor 
may make separate or combined assessments of these risk factors depending on pre-
ferred audit techniques, methodologies and practical considerations (ISA 200.A40; Hal-
onen and Steiner 2009, 176). The auditor may communicate the results of one’s assess-
ment in the form of numbers or addressing qualitative aspects, but the fact that appro-
priate risk assessments are made is more important than the approach taken (ISA 
200.A40). 
Inherent risk is higher for some assertions, classes of transactions, account balances 
and disclosures than for others (See: Table 1, below). Complex calculations or accounts, 
which are composed in part or in full of accounting estimates and are carrying signifi-
cant estimation uncertainty, involve an elevated risk. Also external circumstances, such 
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as technological advancements, or internal factors, such as a lack of sufficient working 
capital to continue operations, may also influence the inherent risk (ISA 200.A38; Hal-
onen and Steiner 2009, 176). For example, the accrual of income over the period of 
many years in a long-term project constitutes an elevated inherent risk. The auditor 
must rely on the plans of the management and his own personal experience as the audi-
tor assesses the ability of the management to foresee costs that fall due. As another ex-
ample of risky items, cash and bearer securities are more prone to misappropriation than 
book-entry securities. Other risk increasing factors are also large number of important 
transactions, transactions with interested parties, flaws in the control functions of the 
computer-based IT system, errors and flaws in the feed information. It is a common 
denominator for the inherent risk that the more the management has decision rights over 
the item, the more risk increases. (Riistama 1999, 83−84). The degree of inherent risk 
may be even increased when the company runs business in various and unrelated 
branches. Dispersed functions, potentially situated across the globe, pose a challenge to 














Figure 2. Audit risk and its components (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 42). 
Control risk is “the risk that a misstatement that could occur in an assertion about a 
class of transaction, account balance or disclosure and that could be material, either in-
dividually or when aggregated with other misstatements, will not be prevented, or de-
tected and corrected, on a timely basis by the company’s internal control” (ISA 
200.13(n)(ii)). Proper internal controls may reduce inherent risks. For example, the risk 
of credit loss increases if the audited company dispatches items to a client whose pay-
ments are constantly overdue. This kind of risk might be tackled by an efficient internal 
audit that sets limits on credit and conducts efficient follow-up and timely reporting. In 
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general, factors that reduce the control risk are well-organised internal control, broad 
coverage and length of budget control, the management’s engagement in analysing 
budgetary difference and acting consequently, continuous development of the account-
ing system, and decision-making at a high level in the organisation in matters having a 
material effect on business and the financial statements (Riistama 1999, 85). 
A potential flaw in the internal control may be indicated by that the management has 
an almost unrestricted authority and it may meddle into virtually all activities in the 
company. It can also be deemed negative if the management is interested to an unnatu-
ral degree in how a certain accounting measure affects the short-term profits or the earn-
ings per share ratio of the company. The may be room for improvement in controls if 
the profits of the company decrease and the sufficiency of finance causes problems, 
which take majority of the management’s time and attention. This is even more valid if 
there are important changes in profitability that cannot be explained by the manage-
ment. The lack of management’s time may relate to the lack of personnel, which leads 
to overtime work or changes in the key personnel. It is also a problem if personnel 
charged with the treasury do not have their vacation or do not assign their duties to their 
substitutes during vacation. In addition, material deficiencies in documentation or the 
acts of setting up or making amendments to documents ex post may prove the necessity 
of improving internal controls (Riistama 1999, 85−86). 
The figure below describes the different components and levels of audit risks and 
factors affecting them: 
 
 
Figure 3. Audit risk, its levels and its components (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 49; 
SMP1, 41, transformed to an Excel broadsheet by the author). 
In practice, the levels of the audit risk are described using terms low, moderate and high 
risk (See: Figure 3). The more material a certain factor, which affects the validity of the 
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financial statements, is considered to be, the more that factor or business process under-
goes efficient audit procedures, and vice versa. Assurance that the inherent risk is re-
duced to an acceptably low level takes place by assessing the risk of failure of internal 
and IT controls and by testing those controls. The auditor performs audit procedures 
concerning internal controls and IT controls. When the auditor deems that those controls 
function normally, usually it can be stated that the level of the audit risk is reduced. The 
same applies to the audit procedures concerning business processes. Usually the audited 
company has set its own tolerable risk level by taking cost-efficiency into account. Nev-
ertheless, the auditor shall always conduct sufficient substantive audit procedures in 
order to reduce the audit risk to the acceptably low level (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 
49−50). With a view to the asset distribution, as the risk of material misstatement is 
reduced to an acceptably low level, the information in the financial statements can be 
considered reliable and valid to be applied as a basis for the asset distribution. 
4.4 Materiality 
The principle of materiality is present in the planning phase and risk response phase of 
the audit. It is present in the final assessment and reporting phase as well (ISA 320.5; 
See: chapter 5 on the phases of audit, below). The materiality is defined in ISA 320.2 as 
follows: “Misstatements including omissions are considered to be material if they, indi-
vidually or in the aggregate, could reasonably be expected to influence the economic 
decisions of users taken on the basis of the financial statements. Judgments about mate-
riality are made in light of surrounding circumstances, and are affected by the size or 
nature of a misstatement, or a combination of both. Judgments about matters that are 
material to users of the financial statements are based on a consideration of the common 
financial information needs of users as a group. The possible effect of misstatements on 
specific individual users, whose needs may vary widely, is not considered.” Such deci-
sions range from the purchase of the company’s shares to engaging in business relation-
ship with the audited company in general. Materiality is not an absolute number but a 
continuum between relevance and irrelevance (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 132 and 134). 
Thus, a material misstatement in the financial statements may affect the asset distribu-
tion and existing or potential shareholders’ expectations about the return on their in-
vestments. 
The auditor must always assume some kind of risk or uncertainty, the degree of 
which is hard to quantify. For example, there are natural constraints in the efficiency of 
the internal control or the applicability of the audit evidence. An auditor must manage 
risks by performing well-considered audit procedures (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 136). 
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With the aid of the following exemplary grid it is described how the auditor assesses the 
risks of different functions and their effect on the required audit evidence:  
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Table 1. Illustration of differing evidence (Adapted from: Arens et al. 2014, 279). 
 
In the first line of Table 1 the inherent risk (A) regarding different functions is de-
scribed. Internal controls are ignored in setting inherent risks because they are consid-
ered separately in the audit risk model (See: formula, on the next page). In the table in-
herent risk was assessed high for acquisitions and payments as well as inventory and 
warehousing, and low for payroll and personnel as well as capital acquisition and re-
payment (Arens et al. 2014, 279). This is due to the fact that payroll transactions are 
simple and routine-like, whereas inventory transactions are complex (Halonen and Stei-
ner 2009, 136). As to the asset distribution, a decision on the applicable amount of dis-
tribution may be difficult for the company, but executing those transactions from one 
account to another could be described as routine. Alternative ways of asset distributions, 
such as share buybacks or transfers, involve more complex and inherently risky transac-
tions. The auditor regards the functions and financial statements as a whole, and all the 
risks involved with the functions of the company may potentially have an effect on the 
financial statements and auditor’s evaluation of solvency. 
Likewise, in the example, the auditor assumes differences in the risk levels of the in-
ternal controls regarding different functions (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 136). The audit 
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risk model shows the close relationship between inherent and control risks. For exam-
ple, an inherent risk of 40 percent and a control risk of 60 percent have exactly the same 
effect on planned detection risk and planned evidence as in the case where the ratios are 
vice versa. Inherent risk multiplied by control risk produce the risk of material mis-
statement. Therefore the auditor may consider them either separately or combined 
(Arens et al. 2014, 280).  
The auditor sets objectives for each assertion, and these objectives encompass asser-
tions for classes of transactions, balances and disclosure. In planning audit procedures 
auditors consider the risks of material misstatements by applying the audit risk model, 
which helps auditors to decide how much and what types of audit evidence needs to be 
accumulated (Arens et al. 2014, s. 277): 
 
Planned detection risk = Accepted audit risk / (Inherent risk x Control risk). 
 
The relationship between control risk and planned detection risk is inverse, whereas the 
relationship between control risk and substantive evidence is direct. If the auditor con-
cludes that internal controls are effective, planned detection risk can be increased and 
evidence therefore decreased (Arens et al. 2014, 280). It is usual to set the level of ac-
cepted audit risk (C) low, which enables the auditor to give out a non-qualified auditor’s 
report (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 136). 
All the above-mentioned points of view (A, B and C) affect the auditor’s decision on 
the required audit evidence. If, for example, the auditor expects that there are only few 
misstatements in payroll functions and that the internal controls work efficiently, the 
auditor considers requiring less audit evidence in payroll functions than in inventory 
functions in accordance with Table 1 (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 137). 
When the auditor constitutes the overall audit strategy for a given audit, the auditor 
defines two levels of materiality: materiality as a whole and performance materiality. It 
is recognised that in qualified situations amounts of one or more particular classes of 
transactions, account balances or disclosures may be below the level of materiality as a 
whole, but nevertheless the auditor may anticipate that those amounts are likely to in-
fluence the users’ decision-making. In such occasions the auditor shall also determine 
the materiality level or levels specifically for those particular classes of transactions, 
account balances or disclosures (ISA 320.10). Therefore, it may be necessary to define 
multiple levels of materiality for particular classes of transactions, account balances or 
disclosures (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 140). By performance materiality reference is 
made to the amount or amounts that are set at a lower level than materiality for the fi-
nancial statements as a whole (ISA 320.9). By doing this the auditor reduces the proba-
bility that the total amount of uncorrected and undetected misstatements is higher than 
the amount of materiality as a whole, and that probability should be reduced to an ac-
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ceptably low level. The difference between the performance materiality and the materi-
ality as a whole gives some margin of manoeuvre to the auditor (Halonen and Steiner 
2009, 141). The actions regarding setting these levels of materiality are extensively dis-
cussed in ISA 320. 
4.5 Professional judgment and scepticism 
Exercising professional judgment in the planning and risk response phase is important 
in order for the auditor to comply with the statutory requirements for auditor’s ethics 
and the ISAs. As the audit is by nature a human activity, the auditor should make in-
formed decisions from the beginning of the audit to its ending. They cannot be made 
without relevant knowledge of and experience in audit, accounting procedures, account-
ing standards and the code of ethics, all of which are applied to the prevailing facts and 
circumstances. Professional judgment is particularly relevant regarding making deci-
sions on different levels of materiality, the degree of audit risk, the nature, timing and 
extent of audit procedures, judging the sufficiency and appropriateness of audit evi-
dence, and evaluating management’s assertions with a view to the applicable financial 
reporting framework (ISA 200.6, 16 and A23; Halonen and Steiner 2009, 50). 
The application of professional judgment is a personal quality, and training and expe-
rience improve the pertinence of conclusions. Yet, even if conclusions made by differ-
ent auditors may differ, professional judgment is deemed appropriate if another experi-
enced auditor arrives at the same result. Professional judgment can be evaluated on the 
basis of whether the auditor’s conclusion, which has been drawn, proves that the auditor 
has applied auditing and accounting principles in an acceptable manner that is generally 
deemed competent. The appropriateness of that conclusion is considered in the light of 
the facts and circumstances that were known to the auditor up to the date of the audi-
tor’s report (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 50; ISA 200.A26). 
In all phases of audit, the auditor shall apply professional scepticism, which refers to 
that the auditor recognises that there may exist circumstances that cause the financial 
statements to be materially misstated (ISA 200.15). Professional scepticism could be 
described as a somewhat dubious attitude under the influence of which the auditor ques-
tions and assesses critically the value of the obtained audit evidence. It is also about 
understanding different situations due to which the financial statements may be materi-
ally misstated. While the auditor applies due scepticism, he or she is in a state of alert 
that, for example, some piece of audit evidence contradicts some other results obtained 
as a consequence of audit procedures. In particular, critical assessment is needed where 
the reliability of documents and the management’s responses to inquiries and other in-
formation are questionable. Professional scepticism covers the whole audit process 
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since the auditor must be able to make appropriate decisions on the nature, timing and 
extent of audit procedures and to gather audit evidence. It is present particularly when 
the auditor evaluates critically the audit evidence (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 51; ISA 
200.A18−A20). 
Professional scepticism does not refer to that the auditor considers the management 
outright dishonest, but the auditor shall take this possibility into account. Professional 
scepticism also refers to that the auditor shall not presume that the management and the 
personnel are completely honest, even if the auditor appreciates past experience of the 
honesty and integrity of the company’s management and those charged with governance 
(Halonen and Steiner 2009, 51; ISA 200.A22). Alert is required in particular in auditing 
the finance function, which is closely related to the asset distribution such that distribu-
tion procedures are duly conducted to the benefit of the entitled parties (shareholders) 
and do not transgress the creditors’ rights to payment. 
4.6 Assertions used by the management 
It is the duty of the management to apply relevant accounting principles, set up appro-
priate internal control and to establish the financial statements (See: FCA Chapter 6, 
Sections 2, 17 and 21). Due to running daily business of the company, the management 
has superior knowledge of the transactions and the financial status. In applying the ap-
plicable financial reporting framework the management makes explicit or implicit asser-
tions, which relate to the recognition, measurement, presentation and disclosure of the 
various elements of financial statements and related disclosures (ISA 315.A123), e.g. 
occurrence, completeness, accuracy, cutoff, classification, existence, rights and obliga-
tions, valuation and allocation (See: Table 2). The auditor may use the abovementioned 
assertions or may express them differently. In both cases all those aspects need to be 





Table 2. Assertions at different levels (SMP 1, 85; Halonen and Steiner 2009, 53, trans-
formed to an Excel broadsheet by the author). 
 
The auditor evaluates the risk of material misstatement at the financial statement level 
and at the assertion level (ISA 315.25). The risk of material misstatement at the overall 
financial statement level (See: Table 2) concern the financial statements as a whole and 
potentially affect many assertions (ISA 200.A35). Such risks are not necessarily risks 
that relate to some specific and identifiable assertions only. Instead, it is more likely that 
the risks of material misstatement at the assertion level may be increased in a more gen-
eral manner. This kind of increase in the general risk level may occur in the mediation 
of deficient control environment or management override of internal controls and as a 
consequence of a fraud (ISA 315.A118−A119). Material misstatements at the financial 
statement level are usually so holistic and all-encompassing that the financial statements 
cannot be concluded to have been established in accordance with the applicable ac-
counting standards. Even the auditability of the company’s financial statements may be 
seriously questioned, for example if the auditor has serious concerns about the integrity 
of the management, company’s records or internal control (ISA 315.A120; Halonen and 
Steiner 2009, 170−171).  
The risks of material misstatement at the assertion level are evaluated separately for 
classes of transactions, account balances, and disclosures (See: Table 2). Such risks are 
assessed in order for the auditor to decide which audit procedures are needed, when they 
are to be performed and what is their scope and extent. This applies to the procedures to 
be conducted in the first stage and to those further procedures that the auditor deems 
Financial Statement Level (Overall) Financial Statements 
 - Pervasive risk that could apply to many assertions
Assertion Level (partial)
Account Balances Inventory Cash Payables
Classes of Transactions Revenues Expenses
Presentation & Disclosures Commitments Related Parties
Relevant assertions Occurrence x x x x
 -  assess risk for Completeness x x x x x x x
    each assertion Accuracy x x x x
Cutoff x x
Classification x x x x
Understandability x x
Existence x x x
Rights and Obligations x x x x x
Valuation and Allocation x x x x x
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necessary to reach the overall objective of audit and to fulfil the requirements of suffi-
ciency and appropriateness of audit evidence. This evidence renders the auditor capable 
of expressing an opinion on the financial statements at an acceptably low level of audit 
risk. It is allowed and even required that the auditors employ different methods in order 
to reach the overall objective of audit (ISA 200.A36). The risks at the assertion level 
need to be considered on an assertion-by-assertion basis (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 
52). In evaluating the risks of material misstatement at the assertion level, the auditor 
may arrive at a conclusion that the identified risks do not relate to some specific asser-
tions only but that they affect the financial statements as a whole and potentially many 
assertions (ISA 315.A122). 
Table 2 is important in that it needs to be understood that the distribution of assets 
can be seriously flawed due to a misstatement at the financial statement or even at the 
assertion level. Yet, if the financial statements are misrepresented only at the assertion 
level, it is more likely that the misrepresentation can be corrected in a proper manner or, 
from the point of view of the asset distribution, it may not have a material effect so as to 
prohibit it. If the misstatement lies at the financial statement level, the financial state-
ments are not likely to be established correctly and, consequently, the distribution of 
assets is without a legal basis. If, despite this, the board of directors makes a proposal 
for the asset distribution, the board of directors may be found liable for a breach of its 
duties and damages to those that have incurred harm due to the proposal. Therefore, in 
such a situation, the auditor shall make an explicit remark on the matter in the auditor’s 
report (See: chapter 6.2). 
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5 PHASES AND TASKS IN A STANDARD AUDIT 
ASSIGNMENT  
5.1 Risk assessment 
The auditor shall comply with a certain audit process, which is generally divided into 
three phases: 1) risk assessment and planning; 2) performing audit procedures (risk re-
sponse); and 3) reporting. Each phase includes several subphases and methods.  
The overall objective of the audit is achieved through understanding the company 
and its environment, which constitutes a basis for planning and executing audit proce-
dures to counter the assessed risks of material misstatement (ISA 315.3). Obtaining that 
understanding is a continuous, dynamic process of gathering, updating and analysing 
information, and these actions are performed from the beginning of the audit to its end-
ing (ISA 315.A1). The auditor is not expected to obtain as in-depth comprehension as 
the management, even if the auditing standards set comprehensive requirements. The 
auditor’s primary consideration is that one has such an insight on the company’s busi-
ness environment, which enables the auditor to meet the overall objective of the audit 
(ISA 315.A3). 
Risk assessment procedures are “the audit procedures performed to obtain an under-
standing of the company and its environment to identify and assess the risks of material 
misstatement, whether due to fraud or error, at the financial statement and assertion lev-
els” (ISA 315.4(d)). The risk assessment procedures shall include inquiries of manage-
ment, individuals within the internal audit function and others who the auditor considers 
to have information, which might help to identify the risks of material misstatement. 
The risk assessment procedures also cover analytical procedures as well as observation 
and inspection (ISA 315.6). The auditor is not required to perform all of the risk as-
sessment procedures for each aspect of understanding. Other procedures may be per-
formed where the data is thought ex ante helpful in identifying relevant risks, such as 
reviewing information obtained from external sources or posing questions to the com-
pany’s lawyers or those having insights in the valuation matters (ISA 315.A5). 
The structure and content of the risk assessment are defined in relation to the audit in 
question. The content is also affected by the fact if the audit is performed for the first 
time or if it has been audited before by the same auditor (Riistama 1999, 77). It is usual 
that the auditor uses information based on one’s knowledge of the audited company that 
has been obtained through previous audit procedures. However, the auditor shall deter-
mine whether amendments have taken place after the ending of the latest finalised audit 
and whether those changes affect the relevance of the past information with a view to 
the current audit (ISA 315.9 and A20). The prior finalised audits may give the auditor 
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data about, inter alia, past misstatements, their timing and rate of correction, and signif-
icant amendments that the company or its business functions may have undergone (ISA 
315.A19). 
The risk assessment phase includes e.g. performing procedures in order to understand 
the audited company, its business operations and internal controls including their im-
plementation so as to identify inherent risk and control risk, and to communicate to the 
management significant identified weaknesses. In particular, the auditor shall obtain an 
understanding of the company’s business environment, including industry, its owner-
ship and governance structures and relationships, types of investments that the company 
is making and plans to make, and finance. The auditor shall identify such risks that re-
quire professional judgment and risks that are not covered by substantive procedures 
alone but require control procedures. In the risk assessment phase the auditor shall rec-
ognise the risks of material misstatement and assess them at the financial statement lev-
el as a whole and at the assertion level (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 54−56; Arens et al. 
2014, 234−240). 
The information about business environment is needed to enable the auditor to un-
derstand the classes of transactions, account balances, and disclosures to be expected in 
the financial statements. The auditor must also deepen one’s knowledge of the compa-
ny’s selection and application of accounting policies and changes therein, as well as the 
company’s objectives and strategies, and those related business risks that may result in 
risks of material misstatement, and the financial performance (ISA 315.11, A24−A26 
and A30−A31; Halonen and Steiner 2009, 159−164; Arens et al. 2014, 234−235). This 
information enables a general evaluation of the level of accounting, budgeting, budget 
control, reporting, finance and fiscal planning, key financial ratios and their develop-
ment, key clients and providers as well as recent material changes in business, such as 
new field, products, product lines, mergers and acquisitions, divisions and research and 
development. Business plans and their credibility are of the importance in auditing a 
company that faces financial conundrums. Unless the auditor has a view on the future of 
the company, he or she has a hard time in evaluating the plans of the management (Riis-
tama 1999, s. 79−83). 
The auditor shall develop an audit plan that shall include a description of the planned 
risk assessment procedures, planned further audit procedures at the assertion level and 
any other planned audit procedures that are required to be carried out so that the en-
gagement fulfils the general objective of audit (ISA 300.9; Halonen and Steiner 2009, 
233) and the quality of the needed resources is sufficient. The auditor must also choose 
which targets are audited and in which order (Riistama 1999, 77−79). 
The evaluation process of material misstatements commences when an auditor is be-
coming familiar with the company and its business environment. The evaluation process 
is ended as the auditor gives out one’s report for the financial year in question. In order 
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to provide a basis for designing and performing further audit procedures, the auditor 
shall first identify risks and relevant controls that relate to those risks. The auditor shall 
then assess the identified risks, in particular, whether they are prone to affect pervasive-
ly the entire financial statements and potentially many assertions, or only bring about a 
material misstatement at the assertion level. Finally the auditor shall consider if the po-
tential misstatement could result in being a material one (ISA 315.26; Halonen and 
Steiner 2009, 175).  
For some risks the auditor may conclude that it is not practical to obtain audit evi-
dence solely by substantive testing and, therefore, control testing is required. This is 
usually the case where business transactions are automated and involve little or no man-
ual operations. Transactions of this nature, such as company’s revenue, purchases, and 
cash receipts or cash payments, may, however, be subject to inaccurate or incomplete 
processing. Nowadays, a considerable number of companies’ transactions are initiated, 
recorded, processed and reported electronically only. Audit evidence, too, may be avail-
able electronically only, and the effective operation of the IT system and controls affects 
directly the quality of the audit evidence. These controls are relevant from the audit 
point of view and the auditor shall obtain a view of their performance (ISA 
315.A140−A141; Halonen and Steiner 2009, 175). 
The auditor should evaluate the distribution of assets at the initial phase of the audit. 
This seems to be a valid practice, too (cf. chapter 7, Question 7). 
5.2 Risk response 
5.2.1 General 
Description. The audit procedures at the assertion level are defined in the audit plan, 
and they are a combination of tests of controls that are designed to evaluate the operat-
ing effectiveness of controls in preventing, or detecting and correcting material mis-
statements at the assertion level, and substantive procedures including tests of details of 
classes of transactions, account balances and disclosures, and substantive analytical pro-
cedures (ISA 330.4 and 6). During the risk response phase the auditor implements the 
planned audit procedures to address the assessed risks of material misstatement at the 
financial statement level (ISA 330.6). The audit plan links the identified assessed risks 
of material misstatement to the audit procedures to be performed. If the audit procedures 
are not related to the identified assessed risks, either useless work is done or the effect 
of new evidence cannot be integrated to the overall audit strategy and to the audit plan. 
As a result of e.g. unexpected events or variation in the company’s environment, inade-
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quate audit evidence necessitates additional procedures and the auditor needs to modify 
the overall audit strategy, audit plan and audit procedures (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 
233−234). 
Usually the tests of control and the substantive procedures are directed to a certain 
item simultaneously. If, based on the misstatements that have been detected in perform-
ing substantive procedures, the auditor concludes that the controls are not operating 
effectively or if important deviations are detected, the auditor shall make specific in-
quiries and determine whether additional tests of controls or substantive procedures 
need to be implemented (ISA 330.16−17; Halonen and Steiner 2009, 57). 
An audit is a cumulative and iterative process. New information may come to the au-
ditor’s attention, and such new information may cause the auditor to adjust the nature, 
timing or extent of other planned audit procedures to the new situation (ISA 330.A60). 
The results of the tests of controls and substantive procedures, which have been per-
formed during the audit, affect the auditor’s final assessment on likelihood of the mate-
rial misstatement in the financial statements. Assessing this likelihood as low, medium 
or high affects the evaluation on the sufficiency and appropriateness of audit procedures 
and audit evidence (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 58). 
At the financial statement level, overall responses to the assessed risks may range 
from simply emphasising to the audit team the importance of maintaining professional 
scepticism to providing more supervision and adding up the degree of unpredictability 
in performing the audit procedures (ISA 330.5 and A1; Halonen and Steiner 2009, 230).  
 
Planning and performing audit procedures. The auditor should consider what the nature 
of the risk is and what the underlying reasons for that risk are (e.g. particular character-
istics of the relevant class of transactions, account balance, or disclosure), assess the 
level of risk of material misstatement at the assertion level for each class of transactions, 
account balance and disclosure, and have a regard to the relevant controls that seek to 
mitigate that risk. Usually relevant internal controls, if tested, reduce the need or scope 
for substantive procedures. However, the auditor shall also obtain more persuasive audit 
evidence the higher the auditor’s assessment of risk is. Some procedures provide more 
reliable audit evidence in relation to some assertions than others. For example, as to the 
completeness of sales revenue, on the one hand, the tests of controls usually provide the 
best audit evidence. On the other hand, the valuation of items in stock is best audited by 
the substantive procedures. As to accounts receivable, external confirmation of balances 
provide more reliability than that of simple verification of invoices or analytical sub-
stantive procedures. Also, the higher the assessed level of risk of material misstatement, 
e.g. due to deficient internal controls, the more reliable and the more relevant the audit 
evidence is needed. If the information regarding frequent transactions is generated by an 
automated IT system, the auditor shall verify and obtain audit evidence of its validity 
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and completeness through the tests of controls rather than through the substantive pro-
cedures (ISA 330.7; Halonen and Steiner 2009, 235−236 and 240). 
Some of the matters the auditor should consider, when the auditor is planning the ap-
propriate mix of audit procedures to respond to identified risks, include, among other 
things, the use of tests of controls, use of substantive analytical procedures and unpre-
dictability of audit procedures. The auditor should also pay specific attention to the 
probability of management override and the need for specific audit procedures to reduce 
that risk to an acceptably low level. Moreover, the response to the identified significant 
risks always calls for relevant substantive procedures (SMP 1, 46; Halonen and Steiner 
2009, 234). 
 
Extent and timing of the audit procedures. Extent of an audit procedure refers to the 
quantity of audit procedures that will be performed (sample size, number of observa-
tions) (ISA 330.A7). When the auditor decides the necessary extent of a certain audit 
procedure, the auditor shall take into account the materiality levels, the assessed risk 
and the degree of assurance that the auditor plans to obtain. Usually the extent of audit 
procedures changes in relation to the assessed risk of material misstatement on the con-
dition that increasing the extent of a certain audit procedure can be done only if that 
audit procedure itself is effective. The extent of each procedure is considered separately, 
even if a combination of procedures is used for a certain audit objective (ISA 330.A15). 
When the auditor assesses that there is an elevated risk of material misstatement in the 
financial statements and that one needs to obtain more persuasive audit evidence, in this 
occasion the auditor may increase the quantity of the evidence, and obtain evidence that 
is more relevant or more reliable (ISA 330.A19). As the auditor decides to modify the 
extent of the testing, the use of computer-assisted audit techniques (CAATs) may enable 
more extensive testing of electronic transactions and account files. Such techniques are 
applicable to selecting an appropriate sample of transactions from key electronic files, 
to sorting qualified transactions or to testing an entire population of transactions. Test-
ing the entire population may occur, for example, in the case of testing the events of 
long-term liabilities (ISA 330.A16; Halonen and Steiner 2009, 238), and this may also 
be applicable to the items of equity, which are closely related to the asset distributions.  
The timing of audit procedures refers to the time of performance of audit procedure, 
and to the coverage period of the audit evidence. The auditor may perform tests of con-
trols or substantive procedures at an interim date or at the period end. Excluding the 
smallest audited enterprises, the audit procedures are performed during the financial 
year, at the period end and after that date. As a rule of thumb, the higher the risk of ma-
terial misstatement, in particular due to fraud, the more likely substantive procedures are 
performed near to or at the period end or at unpredictable times (ISA 330.7, A6 and 
A11; Halonen and Steiner 2009, 237).  
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However, numerous reasons support the intra-period performance of audit proce-
dures. When audit procedures are performed before the period end, this may assist the 
auditor in identifying significant matters early in the audit and in finding a timely re-
sponse to these identified risks (ISA 330.A12). It is also important to try to balance the 
auditor’s workload more equally during the year, not only because of tight reporting 
schedules after the period end but also to counter the risks of fraud by performing audit 
procedures unexpectedly (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 238). 
Typically at the end of the financial year the inventory of current assets is audited to 
cover assertions on the existence and completeness of the current assets. Different as-
pects of events relating to the turn of the financial year are performed at or after the pe-
riod end (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 237−238). Certain audit procedures can be per-
formed only at or after the period end, for example reconciling accounting records to the 
financial statements, examining adjustments made to the financial statements, and per-
forming audit procedures to verify that that the company has not entered into improper 
sales contracts at the period end, or verifying transactions that may not have been final-
ised (ISA 330.A13).  
5.2.2 Tests of controls 
Description. Control activities, automated or not, are the policies and procedures, which 
are applied to ensure that the personnel execute the directives of the management. Ex-
amples of specific control activities include authorisation, performance reviews, infor-
mation processing, physical controls and separation of duties (ISA 315.A96). 
The information obtained in establishing the overall audit plan and in assessing risks 
is applied in performing the audit procedures. The auditor’s understanding of the control 
environment has an effect on the assessment of the material risks and, thus, the auditor’s 
decisions to counter those risks. The auditor must assure not only that the internal con-
trols are adequate and efficient but also that the internal controls of different functions 
are well planned, organised and applied effectively (ISA 330.A2; Riistama 1999, 
91−92). If the company designs and applies internal controls effectively, this may allow 
the auditor to have more confidence in them and the reliability of audit evidence. Defi-
ciencies in the control environment, however, have the opposite effect, in which case 
the auditor may conduct more audit procedures as of the period end rather than at an 
interim date, emphasise the use of substantive procedures, and/or increase the number of 
locations to be audited, where possible (ISA 330.A2).  
Considerations regarding the effectiveness of the internal controls affect significantly 
the auditor’s general approach, that is, whether one places more emphasis on substan-
tive procedures (substantive approach), or an approach that uses tests of controls as well 
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as substantive procedures (combined approach) (ISA 330.A3 and A23). To determine 
the actual level of control risk, the auditor must obtain a sufficient amount of relevant 
audit evidence. On the basis of the test of controls the auditor decides whether one relies 
on those controls or whether more substantive audit procedures are required (Halonen 
and Steiner 2009, 233). The relevant controls need to be tested when the auditor con-
cludes that the substantive procedures alone do not provide good enough audit evidence 
at the assertion level. This may occur when a company conducts its business using IT 
and documentation of transactions is produced or maintained only through or in the IT 
system. It may not even be possible or practicable to obtain sufficient appropriate audit 
evidence only from substantive procedures (ISA 330.A24−A25). Therefore the controls 
relating to such mass transactions have a direct effect on the validity, appropriateness 
and completeness of the audit evidence. The auditor must perform the tests on those 
controls that are designed to mitigate the risks of the relevant mass transactions (Hal-
onen and Steiner 2009, 240). 
The auditor has to decide which controls are suitably designed to prevent a material 
misstatement in a given assertion. Alternatively relevant controls may be designed to 
detect and correct such misstatements. The tests of controls are performed on the afore-
mentioned controls only. If the company has applied substantially differing controls at 
different times, each of those controls is tested separately (ISA 330.A20). The auditor 
may decide that it is efficient to evaluate their design and implementation and simulta-
neously test their operating effectiveness (ISA 330.A21). 
 
Extent and timing of tests of controls. In designing and performing the tests of controls, 
the auditor shall perform other audit procedures in combination with inquiry and other 
audit procedures, such as observation or the CAATs, to obtain audit evidence about the 
operating effectiveness of the controls. Such evidence may relate to the application of 
the controls at relevant times, the consistency of application, and the personalities using 
the controls or means of application (ISA 330.10 (a)). Inquiry combined with inspection 
or reperformance usually provide more reliability in the audit evidence than inquiry 
combined with observation, as the observation covers only the time at which the obser-
vation is made. Also, the nature of the particular control influences the type of proce-
dure required to obtain audit evidence about whether the control was operating effec-
tively. For example, if operating effectiveness is evidenced by documentation, the audi-
tor may decide to inspect that documentation. Yet, there are controls for which the doc-
umentation may not be available or even relevant, such as assignment of authority and 
responsibility or control activities performed by a computer. In such occasions, the use 
of CAATs may provide more reliable audit evidence (ISA 330.A26 and A27). As to the 
effectiveness of a control, when more persuasive audit evidence is needed, it may be 
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appropriate to increase the frequency, time and/or extent of testing of the control (ISA 
330.A28).  
In general, IT processing is inherently consistent. Where such control is effectively 
applied, the extent of testing of an automated control need not may be held steady. The 
auditor is allowed to deem that an effective IT-based control continues to operate con-
sistently unless the program (such as tables, files or other permanent data used) is 
amended. Such tests of consistent effectiveness may include, for example, determining 
that changes to the program are not made without controls and verifying that the author-
ised version of the program is used for processing transactions and not for illegitimate 
purposes. For example, the auditor may inspect the record of the administration of IT 
security to obtain audit evidence that unauthorised access has not occurred during the 
period (ISA 330.A29).  
The auditor shall perform the tests of controls at a certain point in time or over a pe-
riod for which one intends to rely on the effective working of those controls. Typically 
the auditor prefers to trust in the effective working of controls, including IT controls, 
during the entire audited financial period. Audit evidence pertaining only to a point in 
time may be sufficient with regard to inventory counting. Where the auditor intends to 
rely on a control over a period, continuous tests appropriate (ISA 330.11 and A32; Hal-
onen and Steiner 2009, 243). Controls over significant risks shall always be tested in the 
current period (ISA 330.15).  
As to continuous tests, an auditor may even have audit evidence from the previous 
audit (ISA 330.13 and A35). If the auditor cannot find any material changes to the IT 
controls that were considered effective in the previous audit, the auditor may conclude 
that those controls are still working effectively. The auditor shall test such controls at 
least once in every third audit and test some controls in each audit (ISA 330.14(b)). This 
is how the auditor avoids a situation where all the relevant controls are tested in the 
same year and in the two following years no audit procedures on controls are performed 
at all. In this manner the auditor obtains continuous information about the efficiency of 
the control environment. This, in turn, has an effect on a decision on whether the infor-
mation received in the previous audits is applicable (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 244). 
In general, as the risk of material misstatement or the reliance on controls increases, 
the auditor shall perform audit procedures at shorter intervals, if any. A deficient control 
environment, general IT controls or monitoring of controls, a significant manual ele-
ment (human error), changes in key personnel applying controls, significant seasonal 
fluctuations in volume of transactions and changing circumstances indicating need to 
amend the control may decrease the period for retesting a control. These factors may 
also result in that the auditor does not rely on audit evidence obtained in previous audits 




Evaluating the operating effectiveness of controls. On the basis of the misstatements 
that have been detected by substantive procedures, the auditor shall evaluate whether 
the controls are operating effectively or not. However, even their absence does not enti-
tle the auditor to conclude that the controls having bearing on the tested assertion are 
effective (ISA 330.16). Such a material misstatement is only a strong indicator of a sig-
nificant deficiency in the internal controls (ISA 330.A40).  
If the auditor detects deviations from controls on which the auditor is willing to rely, 
the auditor shall make specific inquiries to obtain understanding of the matters in ques-
tion and their potential consequences. The auditor shall determine whether the controls 
can be relied on or whether additional tests of controls or substantive procedures are 
needed (ISA 330.17). Some deviations in the way controls are applied by the company 
may occur. The detected rate of deviation in comparison with the expected rate may 
indicate that the control is not reliable (ISA 330.A41).  
 
Control activities relevant to distribution of assets. In principle, each transaction re-
quires a due authorisation in order for a given control to be satisfactory. The authorisa-
tions can be either general or transaction-specific. Under general authorisation man-
agement establishes policies and subordinates are instructed to implement these by ap-
proving all transactions within their limits. Specific authorisation applies to individual 
transactions (Arens et al. 2014, 317). According to ISA 315, Appendix 1, Paragraph 10, 
certain control activities may depend on the existence of appropriate higher level poli-
cies established by the management. For example, authorisation may be delegated under 
established guidelines, which include but are not limited to investment criteria set by the 
management. It is also recognised that to proceed with major non-routine transactions a 
high level transaction-specific authorisation may be needed. In some cases even the 
specific authorisation from the (qualified) majority of shareholders is needed. In effect, 
the distribution of assets fulfils the latter condition. 
In accordance with ISA 315, Appendix 1, Paragraph 9, different people should be as-
signed the responsibilities of authorising and recording transactions, and maintaining 
custody of assets. Separation of duties is intended to reduce the opportunities to allow 
any person to be in a position, which enables that person the possibility to both perpe-
trate and conceal errors or fraud in the normal course of the person’s duties. Adequate 
segregation of duties involves four general guidelines: 1) the authorisation of transac-
tions for the custody of related assets and segregation of 2) the custody of assets from 
accounting, 3) the operational responsibility from record-keeping responsibility and 4) 
IT duties from user departments (Arens et al. 2014, 316). In the distribution of assets 
points 1 and 2 seem to be especially relevant. 
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5.2.3 Substantive procedures  
Description. In every audit the auditor shall design and perform substantive procedures 
for each material class of transactions, account balance, and disclosure. This duty shall 
be fulfilled without regard to the assessed risks of material misstatement (ISA 330.18). 
It is obvious that the auditor’s assessment of risk is judgmental. The auditor may not 
even identify all risks of material misstatement, but on the other hand one may not con-
sider them as material even if they were identified. Moreover, there are inherent limita-
tions to internal control, and in many occasions the management has the opportunity 
and even capacity to override those controls (ISA 330.A42).  
The auditor may apply external confirmation procedures as substantive audit proce-
dures (ISA 330.19) in addressing assertions associated with account balances and their 
elements, the terms and provisions of contracts, or transactions between the company 
and related and third parties. Other potential situations, where relevant audit evidence 
may be obtained through these procedures, may include inventories held by third par-
ties, property title deeds held by third parties for safe custody or as security, investments 
held by third parties for safekeeping or delivery purposes, and amounts due to lenders. 
In these situations the auditor may also ask for external confirmations to understand the 
relevant terms of the contract and restrictive covenants (ISA 330.A48).  
As to the financial statement closing process, the auditor’s substantive procedures 
shall include the following: “agreeing or reconciling the financial statements with the 
underlying accounting records; and examining material journal entries and other ad-
justments made during the course of preparing the financial statements” (ISA 330.20). 
The nature and the extent of these procedures depends on the nature and complexity of 
the financial reporting process and its risks (ISA 330.A52). 
 
Substantive procedures responsive to significant risks. The auditor shall perform sub-
stantive procedures that are specifically responsive to significant risks. When the auditor 
takes the substantive approach, the audit procedures shall include tests of details (ISA 
330.21). 
Through external confirmations received directly by the auditor from appropriate 
confirming parties the auditor obtains audit evidence having high level of reliability. As 
one example, the auditor may be aware of the management’s bonus-based remuneration 
scheme and the auditor identifies that the management faces pressure to carry out earn-
ings expectations. In such an occasion there may be a risk that the management is inflat-
ing the amount of sales by recognising revenue related to sales agreements prematurely. 
In these circumstances, the auditor may, for example, have the outstanding amounts 




Extent and timing of substantive procedures. On the basis of circumstances prevailing at 
the moment of the audit in question, the auditor may come to the conclusion that per-
forming only substantive analytical procedures will be sufficient to achieve the general 
objective of audit. Again, circumstances may lead the auditor to decide that only tests of 
details are appropriate. The auditor may also consider that the two approaches need to 
be combined, i.e. a combination of substantive analytical procedures and tests of details 
are most responsive to the assessed risks (ISA 330.A43−A44).  
The nature of the risk and assertion is relevant to the design of tests of details. The 
auditor may have regard to the auditable items from various points of view. On the one 
hand, with a view to the existence or occurrence assertion, tests of details may involve 
selecting a group of auditable items from items de facto contained in a given financial 
statement amount and verifying the existence and occurrence of those items. On the 
other hand, as to the completeness assertion, tests of details may involve selecting a 
group of auditable items from those that one could reasonably expect included in the 
relevant financial statement amounts and verifying if these items are de facto and fully 
included in the financial statements (ISA 330.A45).  
As it is mentioned above, the assessment of the risk of material misstatement takes 
account of the level of internal control. Hence, when the auditor concludes that results 
from tests of controls do not satisfy the general objective of audit, the extent of substan-
tive procedures may need to be increased on the condition that that those audit proce-
dures function effectively and are relevant to the to the specific risk (ISA 330.A46). 
Substantive procedures are performed at an interim date and after period end (Hal-
onen and Steiner 2009, 249). In accordance with the auditor’s professional judgment, 
these procedures can be performed in solo or alternatively combined with tests of con-
trols, but they shall provide reasonable basis for extending the audit conclusions from 
the interim date to the period end (ISA 330.22). In most cases, audit evidence from a 
previous audit’s substantive procedures provides only little audit evidence for the cur-
rent period (ISA 330.A54). If the auditor performs substantive procedures at an interim 
date but does not conduct any further procedures at a later date, such an omission scales 
up the detection risk at the period end. The longer the omitted period is, the more the 
risk increases (ISA 330.A56). 
If misstatements, that the auditor did not expect in the risk assessment phase, are de-
tected at an interim date, the auditor shall evaluate whether the related assessment of 
risk and the planned nature, timing or extent of substantive procedures covering the re-
maining period need to be modified (ISA 330.23). When they do need to be modified, 
such modification may include extending or reperforming the previously performed 
procedures at the period end (ISA 330.A58). 
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5.2.4 Analytical procedures 
Description. In the ISAs the term “analytical procedures” refers to “evaluations of fi-
nancial information through analysis of plausible relationships among both financial 
and non-financial data. Analytical procedures also encompass such investigation as is 
necessary of identified fluctuations or relationships that are inconsistent with other rele-
vant information or that differ from expected values by a significant amount” (ISA 
520.4).  
Various methods may be used to perform analytical procedures ranging from per-
forming simple comparisons to performing complex statistical analyses (ISA 520.A3). 
The company’s financial information can be compared with, for example, comparable 
data obtained during the audits of prior periods, forecasts of the company, or expecta-
tions of the auditor. Comparable information may also include relevant similar industry 
information about the financial statements or key ratios, if such information is available 
to the auditor (ISA 520.A1). Analytical procedures also include consideration of rela-
tionships between pieces of financial information that can be expected to move in ac-
cordance with a certain pattern, for example in direct or inverse relation to each other. 
Such relationships may cover gross margin percentages and relationships between fi-
nancial information and relevant non-financial information, such as payroll costs to 
number of employees (ISA 520.A2).  
When designing and performing substantive analytical procedures, either alone or in 
combination with other substantive procedures, the auditor evaluates 1) the suitability of 
such procedures for given assertions and 2) the reliability of data from which the audi-
tor’s expectation of recorded amounts or ratios is developed. Moreover, the auditor 
must evaluate 3) whether one’s expectation is sufficiently precise to identify a material 
misstatement individually or in aggregate with other misstatements. The auditor must 
also determine 4) the acceptable amount of difference between recorded amounts and 
expected values (ISA 520.5). The auditor may make inquiries to the management with a 
view to obtaining reliable information in order to execute an analysis on the aforemen-
tioned matters. Such information may cover also eventual results of any analytical pro-
cedures that the company itself has performed prior to the auditor’s request. When the 
auditor applies the data obtained from the audited company, the auditor shall be satis-
fied that such data is properly prepared (ISA 520.A5). 
 
Suitability of particular analytical procedures for given assertions. Substantive analyti-
cal procedures are generally more applicable to large volumes of transactions that tend 
to be predictable over time. The planned analytical procedures are based on the expecta-
tion that relationships among data continue to prevail, unless the auditor has specific 
reasons to make a conclusion to the contrary. The auditor shall also assess how effective 
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the planned analytical audit procedure will be in detecting a misstatement, and conclude 
whether there is still reason to perform that procedure (ISA 330.A44 and ISA 520.A6).  
If the auditor does not seek to obtain absolutely correct numbers but instead deems 
that a quick and rough estimate is sufficient for some specific purpose, in such occa-
sions even an unsophisticated calculation or a model may prove to be effective. For ex-
ample, recourse to widely recognised trade ratios, such as profit margins, can often be 
used effectively to support the reasonableness analysis of recorded amounts (ISA 
520.A7). However, it is obvious that different types of analytical procedures provide 
different levels of assurance. For the purposes confirming a revenue figure, the calcula-
tion and comparison of gross margin percentages may provide less persuasive evidence, 
but such analytical procedure is likely to support findings that are obtained through oth-
er more appropriate audit procedures (ISA 520.A8).  
As in the case of tests of details, the nature of the risk and assertion is relevant to the 
design of analytical procedures, too. These two types of procedures may be simultane-
ously applied to address to a given assertion. As to the valuation assertion for accounts 
receivable balances, the auditor may apply analytical procedures to an aging of custom-
ers’ accounts in addition to performing tests of details on subsequent cash receipts to 
determine the collectability of the receivables (ISA 520.A9−A10). 
 
The reliability of the data. The reliability of data is influenced by its source (insider or 
outsider information) and nature (company or industry information) and is dependent on 
the circumstances and controls under which it is set up and obtained (completeness, 
accuracy and validity of the data) (ISA 520.A12).  
The internal controls over provision of financial and non-financial information affect 
even the results of the analytical procedures. While the auditor is performing substan-
tive analytical procedures in response to the assessed risks, the auditor may simultane-
ously test the operating effectiveness of controls, if any, over the company’s preparation 
of information. If such controls prove to be effectively designed and applied, the auditor 
is entitled to rely on the information obtained and on the results of the analytical proce-
dures. The aforementioned applies to the testing of non-financial information also: in 
establishing controls over the processing of sales invoices, a company may include con-
trols over the recording of unit sales. In these circumstances, the auditor may test the 
operating effectiveness of both controls (ISA 520.A13).  
 
Evaluation whether the expectation is sufficiently precise. The auditor shall evaluate 
whether one’s expectation is sufficiently precise to identify a material misstatement 
individually or in aggregate with other misstatements. In this sense, relevant matters 
include the predictive accuracy of the expected results which can be obtained through 
the use of substantive analytical procedures. The auditor may consider important the 
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degree to which information can be disaggregated. The procedures are usually more 
effective when they can be applied to individual sections or components of an operation 
than to the financial statements as a whole. The auditor may have a regard also to the 
availability of information, both financial and non-financial, to enable considerations 
regarding the reliability of the information (ISA 520.A15). 
 
Amount of acceptable difference. The auditor must determine the acceptable amount of 
difference between recorded amounts and expected values. Determining the amount of 
difference that is acceptable without further investigation is influenced by materiality 
and the consistency with the desired level of assurance. The auditor must obtain more 
persuasive audit evidence the higher the assessed risk is. Accordingly, as the assessed 
risk increases, the acceptable amount of difference decreases (ISA 520.A16). 
 
Timing and use in asset distribution. The auditor shall perform analytical procedures 
near the end of the audit, so that the results of the performed analytical procedures are 
of aid to the auditor when one makes an overall conclusion on whether the audited fi-
nancial statements are in line with the auditor’s understanding of the company (ISA 
520.6). If, on the basis of the results of analytical procedures, the auditor identifies fluc-
tuations or relationships that are inconsistent with other relevant information or differ 
from expected values significantly, the auditor shall make inquiries to the management 
and perform any other necessary audit procedures. The aim of the auditor is to obtain 
audit evidence that is consistent with other information, taken account of the prevailing 
circumstances (ISA 520.7). 
The whole range of analytical procedures is particularly pertinent when the auditor 
evaluates the solvency in the context of the asset distribution. These procedures have 
been widely applied in practice, too (cf. chapters 2.2 and 7). 
5.2.5 Auditing business processes: finance function 
Description. In general, the companies strive to achieve the goals pronounced in the 
corporate strategy through business processes. In Figure 4 below, the functions outside 
the circle describe the general principles and procedures in the organisation that are 
needed to run effective business management. The functions inside the circle depict the 
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Figure 4. Business processes (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 269, transformed to an Excel 
broadsheet by the author). 
In addition to the functions inside the circle, IT systems and internal control are also 
needed to take care of business transactions. It is the duty of the management to plan 
and implement controls to assure that business transactions, regarding at least sales, 
sourcing, inventory, payroll and finance, are entered for and reported in the IT systems 
in a correct and complete manner. All the business processes may involve numerous 
subprocesses. In practice, an audit assignment is often divided in smaller parts, which 
enables the division of tasks, for example by business process or function, and also ren-
ders the audit assignment more easily controllable. In the end, the journal entries and 
accounts are recorded to the general ledger, finally establishing the financial statements, 
and the audit results of different processes are combined in order to draw overall con-
clusions (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 270). 
The auditor obtains a view about the function and assesses its control risk. In doing 
this, during the financial period the auditor uses five assertions related to transactions, 
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namely occurrence, completeness, accuracy, cutoff and classification. The auditor must 
also recognise the key controls, whose the non- or malfunctioning is likely to cause a 
material misstatement in the financial statements. Next, the auditor combines the identi-
fied controls or the deficiencies therein to the transaction-related assertions and evalu-
ates controls and assertions in unison. The control risk is evaluated on an assertion-by-
assertion basis, which is a critical phase. On this basis the auditor decides the necessary 
test of controls and substantive audit procedures. The assertions presenting at least me-
dium control risk require sufficient amount of appropriate audit procedures (Halonen 
and Steiner 2009, 272 and 280−281).  
 
Processes of finance function. Business processes relating to finance occur in each firm, 
and it involves at least cash, equity and debt management. In the most basic form, the 
finance function is all about managing and recording incoming revenues and outgoing 
payments. The cash management includes the cash flows in different forms. Cash re-
serves cover cash in register, liquid money in the bank accounts and investments to dif-
ferent kinds of liquid securities. The cash management is closely related to other func-
tions, such as sales, sourcing and payroll, because many of these transactions are simul-
taneously cash management transactions. In case the controls of the said processes do 
not work effectively, misstatements in the cash accounts may occur. The cash reserves 
constitute important objects of audit because there is a significant risk of error or fraud 
involved (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 381−382). The finance function is also in a key 
position in the asset distribution. 
As to the cash management, the auditor shall assure through substantive procedures 
that all the cash and other liquid assets exist because they are the most susceptible to be 
embezzled. The auditor shall assure that all the payment transactions are recorded at the 
right time. The auditor shall evaluate whether the management of material amounts of 
money is effective. As to the organisation, the liability of each employee who takes part 
in the management of cash and other liquid assets shall be clearly determined through 
tests of controls. In practice, the most important requirement is that one person only is 
responsible for taking care of each cash register and of each cash account. In addition, 
these persons shall have deputy persons who take over the cash register and cash ac-
count in question at least while the main responsible is enjoying a yearly vacation. It is 
also appropriate that the auditor obtains understanding about the applicable procedures 
in the cash management. Emphasis should be placed on the appropriateness of the au-
thorisations and instructions as well as on the unexpectedness of the audit procedures, in 
particular in small and medium-sized companies (Riistama 1999, 92−94). 
The debt management consists of applicable corporate principles and procedures re-
garding short and long-term credit as well as collaterals. The number of the debt trans-
actions is usually low but their nominal value can be significant. Therefore, the risks 
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involved with these transactions are usually considered material. The audit of these 
transactions may be quite straightforward, but complex terms and provisions in debt 
agreements may complicate the audit considerably as the information needed for the 
financial statements shall be presented in a true and fair manner (Halonen and Steiner 
2009, 382). 
The equity management covers share capital, mandatory and voluntary reserves and 
other eventual investments in equity by the shareholders. As to the audit, it is crucial 
whether the audited company is a public company or a private company. In a private 
company the number of shareholders and equity transactions are usually rather limited, 
which factors are bound to decrease the tasks of the auditor regarding equity manage-
ment. Hence, it may be that the only equity transactions are the entry of the after-tax 
profit to the balance sheet and the amount of the distribution of assets in accordance 
with the decision of the annual general meeting. Yet, in a public company equity trans-
actions may prove to be numerous and their nature to be complicated (Halonen and 
Steiner 2009, 382−383), which increases risks and necessitates more audit procedures. 
 
Documents and information systems of the finance function. When the auditor is obtain-
ing a view about the finance function, it is important to find out the nature of documents 
and business procedures that are being used and applied (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 
270−271). This applies to the management of cash, debt and equity. 
As to the cash management, the most important system is the payment and bank con-
nection program. Through the application of these programs companies pay the bills 
that have become due and obtain information about the clients’ and other parties’ pay-
ments transferred to the accounts of the company. Today, IT systems and appropriate 
applications enable the automatic transfer of bank account information, for example 
clients’ incoming payments received to the company’s bank account and to the accounts 
receivable ledger on the basis of a sales bill. In a like manner, outgoing payments can be 
recorded automatically. Therefore, substantive external confirmations on the bank ac-
count balances, which are printed out and sent directly to the auditor by the bank, still 
play an important role in the audit. Such information about balances given by the bank 
is compared and matched with the bank account balances given to the auditor by the 
company (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 383−384). 
Companies with high leverage and a high number of debt-specific terms and provi-
sions usually have some kind of system for the management of debt and collateral. Usu-
ally such a system not only contains the debt agreement but also enables the calculation 
of interest to be paid and recorded for the current period. Also here the creditors are 
asked to confirm the debt balances and collaterals, and this information is matched with 
that of the audited company (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 384). 
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As to the equity, in a Finnish limited liability company the board of directors shall 
keep a register on shares (share register) if the shares in the company have not been in-
corporated in the book-entry system. Also an alphabetical register shall be kept of the 
shareholders in the share register (shareholder register) (FCA Chapter 3, Section 15, 
Subsections 1 and 2). In such a company, the liability for organising the recording of 
amendments to the registers lies with the board of directors. The audit must cover the 
fact that the changes in the registers are based on reliable evidence on the acquisition 
and that the transfer tax has been paid (FCA Chapter 3, Section 16, Subsection 1; Riis-
tama 1999, 262−263). There may be a specific program or system to that effect, and the 
auditor shall assure oneself of the reliability and effectiveness of such a program or sys-
tem (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 265−266). If the shares in the company are incorpo-
rated in the book-entry system, a computerised share and shareholder register is kept at 
the central securities depository (FCA Chapter 4, Section 3, Subsection 1). 
 
Relevant controls of the finance function. The auditor assesses control risk by investi-
gating the relevant IT systems, key controls and compliance measures (Halonen and 
Steiner 2009, 280). The personnel involved in making transactions and hence dealing 
with the cash flows should not involve in dealing with accounting or subledgers. In 
practice, optimal segregation of duties is possible only in quite large companies. In 
small and medium-sized companies these burdens could be tackled by applying infor-
mation technology, user restrictions and/or internal controls. It is likely that these means 
would reduce the need for extensive audit procedures (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 277 
and 385). 
Many of the transactions in the finance function are material in the financial state-
ments. Therefore, it is necessary to have relevant authorisation for such transactions and 
power to conclude them. In Finnish companies it is usually the board of directors who 
authorises debt transactions and the general meeting that authorises equity transactions. 
Due to the material nature of the finance transactions, it is also of the importance that 
the transactions are duly documented and their recording is instructed. Usually such 
transactions are first recorded to subledgers or auxiliary accounts before entering the 
transaction for the general ledger. Whether the entry is made through automated or 
manual means, in both situations the audit trail between the transaction and the entry 
shall exist. There shall be a matching procedure for information transferred from one 
system to another. Matching refers to that the amounts and numbers of transactions are 
the same in the emitting and receiving system (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 385−386). 
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5.2.6 Audit of administration 
In Finland, “an audit covers the audit of the accounting records, the financial statements, 
the annual report and, in addition, the administration of a corporation or a foundation” 
(FAA Section 11, Subsection 1). In practice, these objects of audit are superfluous to 
some degree. The audit of administration is clearly a national requirement. It is not cov-
ered in the ISAs established by the IFAC, but it is covered in the Finnish adaptation of 
the ISAs established by FIAPA (FIN-ISA Standard 260, Title B). However, in the pro-
visions or in the travaux preparatoires of the current FAA the aims and contents of the 
audit of administration are not discussed. This was done in the Government Bill of the 
now repealed auditing act: it is about monitoring the legality of the management’s ac-
tions, including the duty of due care, and not about the business rationale of those ac-
tions (Government Bill 295/1993, 34; Alakare et al. 2008, 65; cf. Riistama 1999, 249, 
emphasises also that the auditor, as having expertise in business matters, may have a 
reason to pay attention to the business rationale of a decision and the competence of the 
management even if one is not legally obliged to do that). This division clarifies the 
auditor’s role: the auditor cannot meddle in the business judgments of the management. 
In practice, the auditor must assess on a case-by-case basis whether one reacts to a 
measure taken by the management; and when one reacts, it shall be based on the com-
promised legality of that measure (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 428). 
The aim of the audit of administration is to provide audit evidence for assessing 
whether “a partner, a member or the chairperson or the deputy chairperson of the board 
of directors or of the supervisory board or of an equivalent governing body, or the man-
aging director or any other accountable person in the corporation or is guilty of an act or 
negligence which may result in liability in damages towards the corporation or founda-
tion, or has violated a law applicable to the corporation or foundation, or the articles of 
association, deed of partnership, or bylaws of the corporation or foundation”. If any of 
the conditions above is fulfilled, the auditor shall make a remark in the auditor’s report 
(FAA Section 15, Subsection 4; See also: chapter 6.2 on making a remark). 
The main tasks of the auditor are to obtain understanding, among other things, of the 
minutes, annexes and memorandums of the corporate bodies’ meetings, important con-
tracts and background materials with regard to liability for the decision making process 
and of pledges and collaterals. It is also important to audit internal control systems, ac-
counting information systems as well as the share and shareholder registers. The auditor 
should also assure that management of insurance and tax matters are duly organised. 
The objective in auditing matters of accounting law, securities law, tax law and criminal 
law, including frauds and embezzlements, is to hinder the audited company from incur-
ring unnecessary losses due to negligent or intentional acts or omissions (Riistama 
1999, 248−249). Attention shall be paid to that all the necessary matters shall be duly 
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decided in accordance with relevant provisions of the FCA and the articles of associa-
tion of the audited company, documented accordingly and maintained in a reliable man-
ner. However, the shareholders’ contracts are not covered by a statutory audit unless the 
company has included them or their provisions to the articles of association or the com-
pany is committed to comply with such contract (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 431). 
In a Finnish limited liability company the annual general meeting shall decide on the 
distribution of assets (FCA Chapter 5, Section 3, Subsection 2, Point 2). However, ac-
cording to the current FCA, the annual general meeting does not necessarily have the 
auditor’s statement on this matter. On the other hand, the auditor’s report includes one’s 
remarks, where necessary (See: chapter 6.2 below). 
 
Specific concerns in the asset distribution: related party transactions. The good audit-
ing practice requires that the audit covers transactions between the audited company and 
its related parties. The objectives are that, first, the auditor obtains a sufficient under-
standing of related parties, the relevant relationships and transactions and, second, is 
able to recognise relevant fraud risk factors to which those relationships and transac-
tions give rise. Third, on the basis of the obtained audit evidence, the auditor shall as-
certain that the financial statements achieve the objective of fair presentation, and are 
not misleading as well as that the related party relationships and transactions are duly 
identified, accounted for and disclosed in the financial statements (ISA 550.9). 
The auditor shall make inquiries to the management regarding the company’s related 
parties, including changes therein, the nature of the relationships, possible transactions 
with these related parties during the period and, if so, their type and purpose (ISA 
550.13−14). From the beginning of the audit to its ending the auditor shall stay in the 
state of vigilance that there may exist related party relationships or transactions not pre-
viously identified or disclosed to the auditor. Bank and other external confirmations, 
minutes of the shareholders’ and management’s meetings and other such records are key 
sources to the identification of the related party relationships or transactions (ISA 
550.15). 
When the auditor assesses the risks of material misstatement, the auditor shall classi-
fy unusual related party transactions, which occur outside the scope of business stipulat-
ed in the articles of association, as giving rise to significant risks of material misstate-
ment (ISA 550.18). Such unusual transactions may cover, inter alia, complex equity 
transactions. The auditor shall examine the underlying contracts or agreements. While 
doing this, the auditor shall evaluate whether the business rationale of the transactions 
or the lack thereof refers either to fraudulent financial reporting or to misappropriation 
of assets (ISA 550.23). It should be kept clearly in mind that such transactions may in-
volve undercover distributions of assets to all or some of the shareholders. 
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As one part of the audit of administration, the auditor shall pay attention to and react 
to circumstances, which might clearly refer to abuse of or otherwise undue influence by 
the majority shareholders (Riistama 1999, 256 with references). In this manner the ma-
jority shareholders may attempt to not to pay the minority shareholders a dividend or 
not to perform any other distributions of assets, force the minority shareholders out of 
the company and after that grant a larger stake of the distribution to the majority share-
holders. 
 
Specific concerns in the asset distribution: going concern assessment. It is the auditor’s 
duty to “obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence about the appropriateness of man-
agement’s use of the going concern assumption in the preparation of the financial 
statements”. The auditor shall also “conclude whether there is a material uncertainty 
about the company’s ability to continue as a going concern” (ISA 570.6). “A material 
uncertainty exists when the magnitude of its potential impact and likelihood of occur-
rence is such that, in the auditor’s judgment, appropriate disclosure of the nature and 
implications of the uncertainty is necessary for in the case of a fair presentation finan-
cial reporting framework, the fair presentation of the financial statements, or in the case 
of a compliance framework, the financial statements not to be misleading” (ISA 
570.17). 
In the risk response phase the auditor shall consider whether some events or condi-
tions, present at the time of audit procedures, cast a significant doubt on the company’s 
ability to continue as a going concern. The auditor may rely on the prior assessment by 
the management or make one’s own assessment. The auditor may make inquiries to the 
management if the latter has already performed a preliminary going concern assessment 
and evaluate that assessment, if any. The auditor shall also remain in the state of vigi-
lance from the beginning of the audit to its ending for events or conditions that may 
cause a change to that assumption (ISA 570.10−12). The auditor shall assess the situa-
tion himself or herself, and the assessment shall cover at least 12 months (ISA 570.13), 
and the auditor shall ask the managers if they have insights into negative events or con-
ditions that have taken place after the management’s assessment was established or have 
an effect on a posterior period that was covered in the management’s assessment (ISA 
570.15). In such a case, the auditor is required to take active additional measures to con-
clude whether or not a material uncertainty exists in reality (ISA 570.16, introduction). 
Such procedures may include, for example, 1) analysing and discussing the company’s 
latest available interim financial statements, cash flow, profit and other relevant fore-
casts with management, 2) reading the terms and provisions of contracts and determin-
ing whether any have been breached, 3) reading minutes of the shareholders’ and man-
agement’s meetings with an objective to find out references to financing difficulties, 4) 
making inquiries to the company’s legal counsel or others regarding the existence of 
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litigation and claims, the reasonableness of management’s assessments of their outcome 
and the estimate of their financial implications, the existence, legality and enforceability 
of arrangements to have financial support or planned disposals of assets. The auditor 
may also 5) try to identify those events that either mitigate or otherwise affect the com-
pany’s ability to continue as a going concern (ISA 570.A15). 
Analytical audit procedures are especially pertinent in occasions where there is a risk 
of placing the company into liquidation under FCA Chapter 20 or in the conditions that 
may cast a significant doubt on the company’s ability to continue as a going concern 
(Riistama 1999, 153). According to the ISAs the going concern principle is applicable 
unless there is explicit evidence to the contrary, and the auditor shall actively monitor 
whether or not such negative signals exist. The following may indicate that there might 
be a need to liquidate the company: 1) the operative result has been in the deficit for 
rather a long period, 2) the liabilities or claims exceed the assets, 3) bills fallen due can-
not be paid or the credit cannot be novated, 4) long-term investments are financed with 
short-term credits, 5) key financial ratios are weak, 6) suppliers require cash payments, 
7) key personnel resign, 8) market position is lost, 9) loss of a key supplier or 10) a lack 
of materials occurs. These problems may be mitigated by the management, and where 
such issues occur, their plans play an important role (Riistama 1999, 155−157). 
5.3 Reporting 
5.3.1 General objectives of evaluating audit evidence and communication 
“The purpose of an audit is to enhance the degree of confidence of intended users in the 
financial statements. This is achieved by the expression of an opinion by the auditor on 
whether the financial statements are prepared, in all material respects, in accordance 
with an applicable financial reporting framework” (ISA 200.3), that is, to give a true 
and fair view in accordance with that framework.  
In the final phase of the audit, the auditor shall evaluate whether the obtained audit 
evidence is sufficient and appropriate and whether the assessments of the risks of mate-
rial misstatement at the assertion level remain appropriate (ISA 330.25−26). The suffi-
ciency and appropriateness of audit evidence are interrelated and matters of professional 
judgment. Sufficiency is the measure of the quantity of the audit evidence, whereas ap-
propriateness is the measure of the quality of the audit evidence (ISA 200.A29−A31).  
The auditor shall consider whether the level of risk material misstatement level has 
changed, whether the conclusions made are appropriate even in the light of analytical 
audit procedures and whether suspicious events have arisen during the audit or even 
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after the end of the financial year, and what is the effect of uncorrected misstatements to 
the auditor’s report. The auditor writes the auditor’s report and communicates one’s 
reasonable conclusions to the governing bodies. Last, the auditor shall archive the doc-
umentation obtained during the audit (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 59 and 442−443). 
One misstatement in the financial statements may suggest that other misstatements 
exist as well. This may be true, for example, where the auditor is convinced that a given 
internal control does not function as it is supposed to function, or inappropriate assump-
tions or valuation methods have been widely applied by the company (ISA 450.A4). 
During the audit, the auditor shall accumulate the identified misstatements. However, 
this duty does not apply to trivial ones under a given nominal limit (ISA 450.5). 
Moreover, if the amount of detected aggregate misstatements is close to the level of 
materiality as a whole, there may be an unacceptably high risk that possible undetected 
misstatements, taken with the amount of detected aggregate misstatements, could ex-
ceed the level of materiality as a whole (ISA 450.A5). Thus, the levels of materiality 
and the assessment of effects related to those misstatements are tightly interwoven, be-
cause only material misstatements are of the essence. Moreover, the combined amount 
of uncorrected misstatements shall not exceed the level of materiality set to the financial 
statements as a whole. The effect of each individual misstatement on the relevant clas-
ses of transactions, account balances or disclosures is considered by the auditor. This 
assessment includes an assertion-by-assertion consideration if the materiality level for 
those misstatements is surpassed. If an individual misstatement is judged to be material, 
it is unlikely that it can be offset by other mitigating and opposite misstatements (Hal-
onen and Steiner 2009, 447−448).  
As to the communication, a well-planned, organised and executed audit is a prerequi-
site for precise reporting. If the auditor neither sets clear objectives nor plans the audit 
procedures to achieve those objectives, effective communication in writing or otherwise 
is difficult. Also the reader has difficulties to take in the contents. The auditor must dis-
tinguish fact-based documented conclusions from opinion-based assumptions and con-
sider how to mediate the key issues clearly. These reporting qualities are highlighted in 
the case of the audit report, in particular where it is qualified (Riistama 1999, 266). 
Many matters may be and, in practice, are discussed with the management and other 
personnel in the ordinary course of an audit (ISA 260.A32). The auditor shall communi-
cate actively and clearly the matters stipulated in ISA 260 to the management of the 
audited company. These matters concern, in particular, the auditor independence, the 
statutory tasks of the auditor and an overview of the execution of the audit. The auditor 
shall also communicate the observations arising from the audit that are relevant to the 
managers’ responsibility to organise and oversee the financial reporting of the company, 
such as qualitative aspects of the company’s accounting practices, including accounting 
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policies, accounting estimates and financial statement disclosures, as well as significant 
difficulties, if any, encountered during the audit (ISA 260.4−5, 15−17 and A20). 
The auditor shall communicate to the management on a timely basis and in writing 
significant findings from the audit if, in the auditor’s professional judgment, oral com-
munication would not be adequate. Written communications need not include all mat-
ters that have arisen during the course of the audit, but auditor independence shall al-
ways be communicated in writing (ISA 260.19−21).  
Usually the auditor is also bound to communicate the non-trivial misstatements with 
the appropriate level of management and to ask the management to correct those mis-
statements (ISA 450.8). If the management refuses to correct some or all of the mis-
statements communicated by the auditor, the management must disclose its reasons to 
the auditor. The auditor, on the other hand, shall take those explanations into account 
when evaluating whether the financial statements as a whole are free from material mis-
statement (ISA 450.9 and 11). 
 Usually the auditor’s written communication takes place in the form of inspection 
reports, which are discussed in the meetings of managing bodies. Their processing is 
presented in the minutes of the relevant meetings. The auditor possesses a copy of those 
inspection reports as a part of the audit documentation (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 479). 
5.3.2 Auditor’s report 
Description. “The auditor’s report shall contain an opinion on whether the financial 
statements and the annual report give a true and fair view, in accordance with the appli-
cable financial reporting framework, of the result of operations and the financial posi-
tion of the corporation or foundation, and whether the information included in the annu-
al report is consistent with the information included in the financial statements” (FAA 
Section 15, Subsection 2). In Finland, the applicable financial reporting framework in-
cludes the FAA and the decree related thereto or, where applicable, the IFRS, and the 
regulations and guidelines of the Finnish Accounting Board and those of the Finnish 
Financial Supervisory Authority (Alakare et al. 2008, 77). 
 
Emphasis of Matter. The auditor’s report shall include any further information consid-
ered necessary. The requirement is unconditional in case the requirements presented in 
the subsection are fulfilled (FAA Section 15, Subsection 3). “If the auditor considers it 
necessary to draw users’ attention to a matter presented or disclosed in the financial 
statements that, in the auditor’s judgment, is of such importance that it is fundamental to 
users’ understanding of the financial statements, the auditor shall include an Emphasis 
of Matter paragraph in the auditor’s report provided the auditor has obtained sufficient 
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appropriate audit evidence that the matter is not materially misstated in the financial 
statements. Such a paragraph shall refer only to information presented or disclosed in 
the financial statements” (ISA 706.6). As an example, significant doubts on the applica-
bility of the going concern principle or otherwise uncertain events may be brought up in 
a separate paragraph of the auditor’s report. In these cases the auditor may be willing to 
direct the readers’ attention to the circumstances or events that are pervasive but not to a 
degree, which would necessitate a qualified or adverse opinion (Government Bill 
194/2006, 39; Alakare et al. 2008, 79). The necessary supplementary information does 
not affect the duty of the audited company to correct the misstated information in the 
financial statements (Alakare et al. 2008, 79). The Emphasis of Matter paragraph does 
not affect the auditor’s opinion, but an Emphasis of Matter paragraph cannot be used to 
substitute a qualified or adverse opinion, disclaimer of an opinion, or disclosures in the 
financial statements, when they are required (ISA 706.A3; Halonen and Steiner 2009, 
453; cf. Alakare et al. 2008, 79, Chapter 3.5.3 express a view that is slightly contrary to 
the said application guideline).  
Supplementary information, whose presentation is not provided for in the applicable 
accounting and reporting standards, may or may not be considered as a part of the fi-
nancial statements. Supplementary information, whose presentation is not provided for 
in the applicable accounting and reporting standards, must be clearly distinguishable 
from the statutory financial statements (ISA 700.46). Supplementary information, 
whose presentation is not provided for in the applicable accounting and reporting stand-
ards but constitutes an integral part of the financial statements, shall be covered by the 
auditor’s opinion. In the latter situation such information cannot be clearly distinguished 
from the audited financial statements for reasons of the nature and presentation of such 
information, for example notes or cross-referenced supplementary schedules (ISA 
700.47 and A46−A47). 
 
Modifications to the auditor’s report. The auditor’s opinion shall be “unqualified, quali-
fied or adverse. If the auditor cannot express an opinion, a disclaimer of opinion shall be 
expressed in the auditor’s report” (FAA Section 15, Subsection 3). The auditor shall 
express a qualified opinion when the auditor concludes that misstatements in the finan-
cial statements are material but not pervasive. A qualified opinion shall be also ex-
pressed when the auditor is unable to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence but 
nevertheless concludes that the possible effects on the financial statements do not ex-
ceed the level of materiality but only that of pervasiveness (ISA 705.7). A qualified 
opinion covers only the misstatements or conditions that are explicitly stated in the 




The auditor shall express an adverse opinion when the auditor concludes that mis-
statements in the financial statements are both material and pervasive (ISA 705.8). An 
adverse opinion must be given when a qualified opinion would not express clearly 
enough the degree of the misstatements (Government Bill 194/2006, 39). 
The auditor shall disclaim an opinion when the auditor is unable to obtain sufficient 
appropriate audit evidence and considers that the possible effects on the financial state-
ments exceed the levels of materiality and pervasiveness. The same must be done in 
some extremely rare circumstances involving multiple uncertainties the interaction and 
effect of which the auditor cannot assess. Consequently, in such occasions the auditor 
cannot form an opinion on the risks of material misstatements (ISA 705.9−10). 
The situation may be such that the auditor deems the use of the going concern as-
sumption acceptable, but nevertheless a material uncertainty about the continued func-
tioning of the company exists. In such an occasion it is the duty of the auditor to decide 
then if the financial statements give a true and fair presentation of the significant doubt-
casting events or conditions as well as of the management’s plans to counter these risks. 
Furthermore, the auditor shall and disclose clearly that there is a material uncertainty 
related to these events or conditions and that it may be unable to realise its assets and 
discharge its liabilities in the normal course of business (ISA 570.18). If the financial 
statements do represent and disclose the situation fairly, the auditor shall express an 
unmodified opinion with the addition of an Emphasis of Matter paragraph. Moreover, 
the auditor shall make a reference to the note in the financial statements where the mat-
ters described above are clearly disclosed (IAS 570.19). If the auditor deems that the 
financial statements do not give a true and fair presentation of the significant doubt-
casting events or conditions, a qualified opinion or adverse opinion in accordance with 
ISA 705 shall be expressed (ISA 570.20). 
 
Submission of the auditor’s report. The auditor’s report shall be submitted to the board 
of directors no later than two weeks before the shareholders’ meeting where the board 
of directors present the financial statements to be adopted (FAA Section 15, Subsection 
6). However, unanimous shareholders may agree on shortening the period. Usually, the 
auditor’s report is directed to the general meeting because the decisions on the adoption 
of the financial statements and on the use of the profit shown on the balance sheet shall 
be made at the ordinary general meeting. In other occasions it can be directed to the 
governing bodies of the audited company (Government Bill 1994/2006, 40; Halonen 
and Steiner 2009, 453-454; Mähönen and Villa 2010, 422). With a view to the distribu-
tion of assets, the timely submission of the auditor’s report is of the essence so as to 
enable the shareholders’ effective familiarisation and decision-making on the matter. 
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5.3.3 Audit memorandum 
“An auditor may make remarks to the board of directors, the supervisory board, the 
managing director or other accountable party about matters not covered in the auditor's 
report. These matters shall be entered into the audit memorandum. The audit memoran-
dum shall be submitted to the governing body responsible for the administration of the 
corporation or foundation and for the proper conduct of its operations. This body shall 
process the audit memorandum without delay and retain it in a reliable manner” (FAA 
Section 16). The audit memorandum shall be clearly titled because of its non-public 
nature, which is different from the public nature of the auditor’s note and auditor’s re-
port. However, if there is a cross-reference, the audit memorandum becomes a public 
document (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 455−456). The objective of the audit memoran-
dum is to inform the responsible managing bodies in a confidential manner, and there-
fore, usually the public documents make no reference to the fact that the audit memo-
randum has been given (Government Bill 295/1993, 35; Riistama 1999, 271). 
There are no exact provisions in the legislation with regard to the form and content of 
the audit memorandum. In general, the audit memorandum includes practicalities relat-
ing to the accounting and administration that are not necessary to present publicly in 
auditor’s report. Such practicalities are nevertheless important to the management, such 
as findings that urge for a swift correction. The subject matters relate to audit findings, 
usually of the accounting, financial statements, annual report, internal control, asset 
management or administration (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 456). Unless the audit mem-
orandum has not been processed and its negative findings duly corrected by the compa-
ny, its content may later be repeated and presented in the auditor’s report. Usually it is 
considered satisfactory that the audit memorandum is discussed in the next meeting af-
ter that it has been given. Its content may, however, necessitate a specific meeting of a 
managing body. The audit memorandum shall be maintained and documented in order 
to be a source of information for later responsible persons and auditors (Riistama 1999, 
273; Halonen and Steiner 2009, 455).  
5.3.4 Inspection report and working papers 
An inspection report refers to all reports that are not auditor’s reports or audit memo-
randum provided for in the FAA. Thus, the auditor may give out an informal, internal 
inspection report, where the auditor may describe the performed audit procedures, find-
ings, (legal and non-legal) conclusions and suggestions for improvement to be made. In 
the inspection report the auditor may also review whether the audited company has exe-
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cuted any of the auditor’s previous suggestions for improvement (Halonen and Steiner 
2009, 475; Riistama 1999, 269).  
Inspection reports are usually initiated and established by the auditor, but it is possi-
ble that the company has included a stipulation in its articles of association or the gen-
eral meeting has asked the auditor to report about the progress of the audit. It is a good 
practice to discuss the findings with the managing bodies before giving out the inspec-
tion report (Riistama 1999, 269). With a view to the distribution of assets, this means of 
communication could be used for the purpose of improving the distribution process. 
Working papers refer to all the documents that the auditor establishes or obtains for 
his or her own documenting purposes. Working papers are neither published nor dis-
closed. Their purpose is to aid the auditor in planning and executing the audit, to prove 
the methodology used and to provide assurance of the quality of the audit. The working 
papers are also the auditor’s notes, which refer to copies of the audited documents that 
are also included in the working papers. The auditor needs to maintain one’s working 
papers long enough and in a reliable manner. They can be divided into permanent doc-
uments, such as basic client data, and temporary documents, such as audit of a certain 
period (Riistama 1999, 314). With a view to the distribution of assets, the auditor could 
provide a calculus for the solvency test, yet for one’s personal use. 
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6 AUDITOR’S TASKS IN THE CONTEXT OF ASSET 
DISTRIBUTION IN FINLAND 
6.1 Inspecting matters regarding asset distribution 
There are neither explicit provisions nor a recommendation on what the auditors should 
do when assessing solvency in the context of the asset distribution. Therefore, the audi-
tors are relying mutatis mutandis on ISA 570 “Going Concern” and good auditing prac-
tice, which includes principles (e.g. independence, objectivity, integrity, due care) and 
methods. The relevant sources of good auditing practice in Finland are acts and decrees, 
decisions and statements by Auditor Board of the State, Auditor Board of the Central 
Chamber of Commerce, courts and authorities, auditing standards as adopted in Finland, 
professional literature and observations about how diligent professionals generally act 
(Halonen and Steiner 2009, 31–32). 
In effect, ISA 570 is considered central to evaluating solvency of the audited compa-
ny. Under the going concern assumption, a company is viewed as continuing in business 
for the foreseeable future. Assets and liabilities are recorded assuming that the company 
will be able to realise its assets and discharge its liabilities in the normal course of busi-
ness. The assumption is used unless there is clear evidence to the contrary (ISA 570.2). 
Some jurisdictions, such as Finland (FAA Chapter 3, Section 3, Subsection 1, Point 
1) and some financial reporting frameworks, such as International Accounting Standard 
(IAS) 1, paragraphs 25−26, explicitly require that the management makes a specific 
assessment of the company’s ability to continue as a going concern. In this context, 
there are also some specific standards regarding matters that need to be considered and 
disclosed (ISA 570.3). While the management assesses the ability of the company to 
continue as a going concern, the management has the best but yet only a limited 
knowledge and it is bound make certain estimates about inherently uncertain future out-
comes of events or conditions. Furthermore, the longer the assessment period is, the 
more uncertain the outcome of that estimate will be. Also the size, nature and complexi-
ty of the company and its business affect the outcome (ISA 570.5). 
 In considering the application of the going concern assumption, the auditor inquires 
of the management whether it has already performed a preliminary assessment on the 
use of the going concern assessment (See: chapter 5.2.6 and ISA 570.10−12). The audi-
tor shall make his or her own assessment of the situation and cover the same period as 
that used by management, or a longer period if required by law or regulation. The audi-
tor asks the managers if they have insights into negative events or conditions that have 
taken place after the preliminary assessment was established or have an effect to a pos-
terior period that was covered in the preliminary assessment (ISA 570.13 and 15). 
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In performing the solvency test in the context of the asset distribution, the auditor 
may use the same methods and procedures as one applies in a general solvency assess-
ment. If the auditor identifies any doubt-casting events, such as asset distribution, or 
conditions, such as declining profitability of the company, the auditor shall obtain suffi-
cient appropriate audit evidence to determine whether or not a material uncertainty over 
these events or conditions exists. Through performing additional audit procedures, in-
cluding consideration of mitigating factors, the auditor shall assure that the asset distri-
bution does not cause the insolvency of the company (cf. ISA 570.16). Relevant audit 
procedures may include the ones enumerated above (See: chapter 5.2.6 Specific con-
cerns in the asset distribution: going concern assessment and ISA 570.A15). 
6.2 Reporting matters regarding asset distribution: a remark and a 
Going Concern opinion 
The auditor shall make a remark in the auditor’s report if a member of a managing body 
or any other accountable person in the corporation or foundation may be found guilty or 
liable of an offence within the meaning of FAA Section 15, Subsection 4 (See: chapter 
5.2.6). The auditor must take into account the materiality principle such that a minor 
breach does not cause a remark (Government Bill 194/2006, 40). 
In particular, in FAA Section 15, Subsection 4, Point 2, the question is mainly about 
a breach against the FCA and articles of association. In addition, the auditor must moni-
tor the application of provisions of accounting law, securities law, tax law, fraud and 
embezzlement in the criminal law. The list is not exhaustive, taken account of the audit-
ed company’s field of business (Government Bill 194/2006, 40). One important situa-
tion where this provision is applicable is when the auditor finds out that the board of 
directors’ proposal for an asset distribution is in contradiction with the solvency test or 
the balance sheet test (i.e. FCA Chapter 13, Section 2 or 5), or with the articles of asso-
ciation. In such an occasion, the auditor shall make an explicit remark (Government Bill 
194/2006, 38 and 40). In other occasions, the auditor gives an implicit opinion on the 
asset distribution (Alakare et al. 2008, 80). If the remark is omitted, the auditor consid-
ers the proposal for the distribution of assets to be legal (Mähönen and Villa 2010, 422).  
The auditor shall justify one’s remark, and in doing so the audit evidence obtained 
during the audit procedures is of the essence (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 452–453). The 
evaluation on how important the remark is the duty of the management and the general 
meeting of the company (Government Bill 194/2006, 39; Mähönen and Villa 2010, 
420). Importantly, the auditor is no longer automatically bound by the law to express a 
specific opinion on the distribution of assets because those opinions are considered to be 
included in the general opinion in the auditor’s report. Yet, the FAA or the ISAs do not 
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prohibit the auditor from expressing such opinions, and one may do so voluntarily or on 
the basis of the articles of association or a request by or agreement with a relevant cor-
porate body, e.g. the general meeting or the audit committee, where applicable. Com-
plying with such a demand is considered to be in accordance with the good auditing 
practice and therefore such a demand shall be fulfilled (FAA Section 19, Subsection 3 
and Section 22, Subsection 2; ISA 700.38; Auditor Board of the State 1/2009, given out 
31 August 2009). Such requests are not included in the accounting directives or the 
ISAs (Government Bill 194/2006, 22–23). Therefore, such requests may be confusing in 
multinational companies as these requirements do not constitute a part of ISA 700 
(Mähönen and Villa 2010, 417−418 with references). 
Hence, there are occasions where the auditor shall make a conclusion on the appro-
priateness of the management’s assessment on the solvency in the context of the asset 
distribution. If the management has accepted that the company remains solvent after the 
assumed asset distribution and that the relevant financial statements are established by 
applying the going concern assumption, but the auditor deems that a material uncertain-
ty about the continued functioning of the company exists and therefore the manage-
ment’s use of the said assumption is unacceptable in a pervasive and material manner, it 
is the duty of the auditor to make a remark or even express an adverse opinion (cf. ISA 
570.17 and 21). If the auditor deems that the financial statements give a true and fair 
view about the situation and the doubt-casting events or conditions are duly disclosed, 
the auditor shall express an unmodified opinion and include an Emphasis of Matter par-
agraph, where one considers it necessary (cf. ISA 570.19 and A21). If adequate disclo-
sure about the solvency and/or the doubt-casting events or condition is not made in the 





7 SURVEY OF FINNISH AUTHORISED AUDITORS 
7.1 General 
The survey used comprised four different parts. First, descriptive information about the 
respondents and the size of their employee and their clients were collected. Second, the 
respondents were asked whether they consider the topic important. Third, some ques-
tions about the solvency test, documentation, lack of solvency and reporting of solvency 
were asked. Finally the auditors were given open space to express their topic-based 
comments freely. All the questions in the survey were visible to the respondents at once. 
7.2 Descriptive results 
Q1-2: In the beginning of the survey, it was found that the majority of the respondents 
(40/53) had worked more than 10 years as an authorised auditor. The distribution 
among the rest of the respondents was rather equally divided (Question 1). The majority 
of the respondents (42/53) did not work in a so-called Big Four audit firm, whereas the 
rest of the respondents (11/53) worked in such an audit firm (Question 2). 
 
Q3: The majority of the respondents (35/53) consumed most of the total budgeted hours 
in the audits of companies with revenues less than 999.999 €. Apart from that, 11 re-
spondents audited mainly companies with revenues of 1.000.000 – 9.999.999 €, 2 re-
spondents companies with revenues of 10.000.000 – 49.999.999 €, and 5 respondents 
companies with revenues of at least 50 000.000 €. 
 
Importance of analysing solvency 
 
Q4: The respondents were requested to define solvency in the distribution of assets. In 
total, 47 answers were given. The answers can be divided into five general categories 
and, in addition, into a combination category, as follows:  
1) In the first and the most important category (32/47), the respondents stated that the 
solvency in the asset distribution refers to that the company is able to discharge itself of 
the decided asset distribution and of its liabilities to the creditors. This idea was ex-
pressed in various terms, but the idea remained uniform among the answers.  
2) In the second category, certain calculation formulas and financial ratios were pre-
sented (7/47).  
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3) In the third category, the respondents mentioned some items in the financial 
statements, the sufficiency of which the respondent assures (3/47).  
4) In the fourth category (2/47), the solvency was defined as a possibility to obtain 
financing so as for the company to be able to perform the asset distribution.  
5) In the fifth category, some general principles were presented, one respondent stat-
ed that the liquidity and the going concern principle are in central position in evaluating 
the proposal for the asset distribution. Another respondent highlighted the importance of 
the creditors in the payment order, even when the financial forecasts seem bad. Third 
respondent referred to the definition of solvency in the Bankruptcy Act (120/2004).  
6) In the sixth combination category, the respondents paid attention to a certain item 
in the financial statements (for example, the amount of cash or other liquid assets) or 
financial ratio (for example, current ratio), and an assessment of solvency was consid-
ered through these items or financial ratios. 
In addition, outside any clear categories, one respondent deemed that it must be clari-
fied from the financing parties of the company whether there are possibilities to obtain 
further finance, possibilities to increase share capital or find a new financer, and wheth-
er there is any realisable property. Unless any of these are executable, company restruc-
turing is an option. Moreover, many respondents limited their assessment to 12 months 
at most. 
 
Q5: The respondents were asked how common it is that the audit client has established 
a documented assessment on solvency in the context of a distribution of assets, meas-





Figure 5. Occurrence of a documented assessment of solvency in the context of asset 
distribution. 
It seems that the Finnish audit clients seldom establish a solvency assessment. Only 3 
out of 53 respondents opined that the setting up of a documented assessment is a stand-
ard practice. 
 
Q6: The auditors expressed their opinion on whether they disagreed or agreed with the 
statement “I consider auditing the evaluation of solvency by audited company an im-
portant part of the tasks of the auditor”. The majority of the respondents (43/53) agreed 
or completely agreed with that statement. The rest of the respondents were equally dis-
tributed among the other options (completely disagree, disagree, neutral). 
Some respondents considered it rare that a single asset distribution event would lead 
the company to insolvency. Therefore the entire solvency test was deemed useless. Ei-
ther other decisions cannot be made so that the solvency is jeopardised. Yet, if the sol-
vency is already at risk and a proposal for the asset distribution is made, then reporting 








Auditing the evaluation of solvency in practice 
 
Q7: The auditors were asked whether they take into account the solvency of the audited 
company and its evaluation in the asset distribution in certain phases of audit. Multiple 
options were simultaneously available. The following findings were found: 
 
Figure 6. Taking into account the solvency of the audited company and its evaluation in 
the asset distribution in different phases of audit. 
Figure 6 proves that the solvency is taken into account in all phases of the audit. Yet, its 
pervasiveness varies considerably depending on the phase. Its occurrence is at its mini-
mum in the tests of controls and in performing the substantive procedures, in particular 
tests of details. In planning the audit (23/53) and in performing analytical procedures 
(25/53) approximately half of the respondents have paid attention to the solvency. The 
majority of the respondents have considered solvency in audit of administration (40/53) 
and when reporting (37/53). Therefore, it seems that the importance of taking account of 
solvency increases in the beginning and towards the end of audit process. 
 
Q9-10: The majority of the respondents (38/53) have always paid attention to the doc-
uments that the audited company has made. Moreover, 14 respondents have done that 
sometimes. Only one respondent has never paid attention to the said documents (Ques-
tion 9). Next, those who answered in affirmative in Question 9 were asked to elaborate 
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to which documents they have paid attention (Question 10). Multiple options were sim-
ultaneously available. The following results were obtained: 
 
 
Figure 7. Documents to which attention is paid. 
The respondents have mostly looked at the income statement (39/52) and the balance 
sheet (49/52). The respondents have considered slightly less the cash flow statements 
and cash flow budgets by the management (both 32/52), followed and budgets by the 
management (26/52) and the annual report (25/52). One auditor mentioned notes to the 
financial statements as an alternative source of evaluation. 
 
Q11-12: Approximately half of the respondents (25/53) have always paid attention to 
indicators or ratios characterising the financial position of the audited company. Moreo-
ver, 22 respondents have done that sometimes. Only six respondents have never paid 
attention to the said indicators or ratios. Next, those who answered in the affirmative in 
Question 11 were asked to elaborate to which indicators or ratios they pay attention 





Figure 8. Ratios or indicators to which attention is paid. 
The majority of the respondents have paid attention to the equity ratio (39/47) and to the 
relative indebtedness (31/47). Return on assets/investments, net profit ratio and other 
options, of which quick ratio, current ratio and a calculus of financial assets minus 
short-term debt, obtained some support, too. One respondent also mentioned that he or 
she has applied the solvency test established in 2007 by the HTM-tilintarkastajat ry 
(HTM-auditors’ association, another auditor organisation representing authorised audi-
tors in Finland, now merged with FIAPA in spring 2014), which includes 20 different 
sections regarding the solvency test. 
 
Q13: The ones who answered in the negative to Question 11 were asked to elaborate 
their views. Varied answers were given. As many companies have not set up any specif-
ic calculations, certain respondents deemed that usually the information in the financial 
statements or a certain line therein, for example the amount of working capital, is 
enough to evaluate solvency. Some respondents make their own calculations, for exam-
ple one respondent stated that he or she finds out whether the audited company has paid 
the taxes, whether there are any subordinated loans, and whether the equity is positive 
or negative. One respondent has inspected the credit agreements and has turned to the 





Reacting on the evaluation of solvency 
 
Q14: A question was posed on whether the respondent has been in a situation where the 
evaluation of solvency by the audited company has been deemed inadequate to a degree 
that, in one way or another, the respondent has been obliged to react on the evaluation 
of solvency, under the new Finnish Limited Liability Companies Act (the FCA entered 
into force on 1 September 2006). More than half of the respondents (30/53) have been 
in a described situation, while the rest (23/53) have not faced such a situation. 
Some respondents highlighted the rarity of the solvency testing. For instance, one re-
spondent stated that he or she has given out over 6.000 auditor’s reports during the ca-
reer, of which the solvency testing has been applied in three occasions only. Under the 
new FCA, this responded has assessed the solvency only in other ways than the alterna-
tives given in the survey and has documented every occasion in his or her working pa-
pers. Another respondent mentioned that he or she has succeeded in avoiding situations 
where the asset distribution has been proposed as the solvency has been limited.  
On a number of occasions, the respondents considered that the matter has been dis-
cussed with the board of directors during the period or at the period end, and the com-
panies have abstained from the proposal for the asset distribution or from share buy-
backs. 
 
Q15: Those who answered in the affirmative in Question 14 were asked that in how 




Figure 9. Occurrence of a reaction to an inadequate evaluation of solvency, in years. 
During the eight years from the entry into force of the FCA to May-June 2014 when the 
survey was conducted, the answers to Question 15 seem to have been bipolar. On the 
one hand, those who have reacted to an inadequate evaluation of solvency have done it 
in one or two years only. On the other hand, there is a group of respondents who have 
done it rather frequently, at least in five years. The results are wholly descriptive in na-
ture as this question was not commented in Question 23. 
 
Q16: The respondents were also asked that how many times they have been obliged to 
react on the evaluation of solvency altogether, under the new Finnish Limited Liability 





Figure 10. Occurrence of a reaction to an inadequate evaluation of solvency, in times. 
Compared with the answers given in Question 14 above, the outcome of Question 16 is 
mixed. In Question 14 we could see that 23 respondents stated that they had not been in 
a situation where a reaction was to be taken. It was anticipated that that number would 
equal to or be close to the option “0 times” in Question 16. That does not seem to 
match, as the number in the latter question is only 11. 
However, the answers give a persuasive indication that the majority of respondents to 
this question have reacted to an inadequate evaluation of solvency 1-10 times during 
eight years of the FCA. Also a considerable number of respondents opted for 0 times 
and 11-20 times. Contrasting the results for option “0” with the options “21-30” and 
“more than 30 times”, it could be reasonably asked whether this is a coincidence or 
whether the auditors’ personalities play a role, as some respondents do not react to the 
in a described situation and others react tens of times during the same period. 
 
Q17-18: The respondents were also asked whether they, in one way or another, have 
been obliged to react on the evaluation of solvency by the audited company in the asset 
distribution context during the last 12 months (Question 17). The majority of the re-
spondents (31/53) answered in the negative. The rest (22/53) answered in the positive. 
Those who answered in the affirmative in Question 17 were asked whether there was 
a specific situation involved at the same time with the distribution (Question 18). Multi-
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ple options were simultaneously available. In 3 situations there had been an audit of a 
group involved and in 5 situations a company restructuration.  
In 11 situations there was other event occurring. For example one respondent stated 
that in one case the amount of tax liability of the audited company was more the amount 
of distributable assets. Another respondent stated that in one case the dividend was paid 
throughout the year even if there were not enough distributable assets. The same re-
spondent opined that the evaluation of solvency is usually non-existent when unrestrict-
ed capital is distributed in the middle of the period, of which the auditor takes account 
only later next year when the financial statements are audited. Accounting firms do not 
propose the distribution of assets unless enough distributable unrestricted equity exists 
(on the basis of the balance sheet test). In the smallest companies no one even sets up 
the solvency test.  
 
Q19: It was asked which measures the respondent has taken when reacting on the eval-
uation of solvency. Multiple options were simultaneously available. The following dis-
tribution ensued: 
 
Figure 11. Reactive procedures. 
Compared with the answers given in Question 17 above, the outcome of Question 19 is 
mixed. In Question 17 we could see that 30 respondents stated that they had reacted to 
an assessment of solvency. It was anticipated that that number would equal to or be 
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close to the total number of respondents in Question 19. That does not seem to match, 
as the number of respondents in the latter question is even 40. 
However, the answers give a persuasive indication that the majority of respondents to 
this question have reacted to an inadequate evaluation of solvency by encouraging the 
audited company to establish one or more documents (approximately half of the re-
spondents). The rest of the options have also been met in practice.  
As other way of reaction it was often mentioned that the audited company had post-
poned the decisions on the asset distributions. One respondent stated that if the financial 
status of the company were critical, the proposal for the asset distribution would be sub-
ject to discussion, at least in the small companies. If the situation improved, such a 
company would have the possibility to execute distribution later. In a company where 
the ownership is not dispersed, a dividend, that has been decided to be paid without an 
exact payment date, is usually executed at a date that is appropriate for the company. 
 
Reporting the audit of the evaluation of solvency 
 
Q20: The respondents were asked about the way and level that they have, in general, 
reported on the evaluation of solvency by the audited company. Multiple options were 
simultaneously available. The following distribution ensued: 
 




Some of the respondents (12/53) have not reported on the matters of solvency. Howev-
er, the majority of the respondents (41/53) have reported on the topic. The most of it has 
occurred orally, but also various ways of reporting (in audit minutes; in auditor’s report; 
in other way, which, explain in the end of the questionnaire), mainly in writing, have 
taken place. As an alternative way of reporting electronic mail was mentioned. 
 
Q21: The respondents were asked about the way and level that they have, in general, 
reported on the shortcomings in the evaluation of solvency by the audited company. 
Multiple options were simultaneously available. The following distribution ensued: 
 
 
Figure 13. Way and level of reporting on the shortcomings of solvency. 
The majority of respondents (39/53) have reported on the topic. Mostly this kind of re-
porting has taken place orally, but also written ways of reporting (in audit minutes; in 
auditor’s report; in other way, which, explain in the end of the questionnaire), have been 
used. Even here electronic mail was mentioned as one medium. However, a considera-
ble number of the respondents (14/53) have not reported on the shortcomings of solven-
cy. 
As other ways of reacting, three respondents stated that, in small companies in par-
ticular, they have discussed the matter with the management, and usually the manage-
ment has decided to revise the proposal for the asset distribution or to abstain from the 
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asset distribution before the final reporting by the auditor. Some respondents have either 
favoured oral reporting or written reporting, but the non-public manner of reporting on 
the matter was emphasised. Instead of writing the matter in the auditor’s report or the 
audit memorandum, electronic mail, inspection reports or management letters were 
mentioned as a means of communication. One respondent deemed that the fact, that the 
auditor reports to the right body at the right time and documents it, is only relevant, not 
the non-public reporting in itself. One respondent considered that the size and owner-
ship structure have affected the appropriate means of reporting. 
 
Q22: In addition, the respondents were asked to whom they have reported on the short-
comings in the evaluation of solvency by the audited company. Multiple options were 
simultaneously available. The following distribution ensued: 
 
 
Figure 14. Corporate bodies to which the reporting was made. 
The majority of respondents (40/53) have reported on the topic. In most cases (28/53) 
the corporate bodies receiving reporting have been the board of directors or the audit 
committee and the chief executive officer. Also the other options have reached some 
support. Here, too, a considerable number of the respondents (13/53) have not set up a 
report to any corporate body. 
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Q23 / Other comments: One auditor remarked that in general the auditor may en-
courage the company to but does not demand it to abide to the law. If the law is not fol-
lowed, it is written down in the auditor’s report. 
Another respondent described the audit process in practice. First, the financial state-
ments are established and then audited. If material misstatements are found, they are 
fixed. For example, if the proposal for the asset distribution jeopardises the solvency, 
the proposal is amended. No writing reports to the audit committee or alike is done. As 
to the evaluation solvency, especially in small and medium-sized companies, one thing 
that was not taken into account in the survey is that the general meeting may decide 
otherwise than the proposal for the board of directors. There the auditor’s evaluation 
loses its significance. 
Some respondents considered that small and big companies live in different worlds. 
One respondent opined that, in general, legal precedents would be needed on what 
solvency means in practice, e.g. is it enough it the company has liquid cash or taken a 
loan as the financial statements are established.  
7.3 Correlations and their implications 
Even if the low number of respondents, 53, renders the statistical results weak, on the 
basis of the descriptive statistical correlations (See: Appendix 2, for further information) 
the following remarks could be made. 
When the survey was established, in any question, Webropol program gave the 
smallest numerical value (1) to the response alternative that was situated at the top, 
above all other response alternatives. The numerical values increased (2, 3, etc.), as the 
other response alternatives went downwards. In general, when comparing any two ques-
tions, if a respondent has opted for the response alternative at the top (bottom) in Ques-
tion X and also the response alternative at the top (bottom) in Question Y, the two ques-
tions represent a positive correlation. By contrast, if a respondent has opted for the re-
sponse alternative at the top (bottom) in Question X and the response alternative at the 
bottom (top) in Question Y, the two questions represent a negative correlation. 
It would seem that the answers to Questions 1 and 2 correlate positively at a statisti-
cally significant level (p<0,01), and the answers to Questions 1 and 3 correlate negative-
ly at a statistically significant level as well as the answers to Questions 2 and 3 correlate 
negatively at a statistically very significant level (p<0,001). For the purposes of this 
study, these indicators would suggest that the more the respondents have had working 
years, the more likely it is that they do not work for a so-called Big Four audit firm and 
have small and medium-sized companies as their clients. The results can be explained 
by the fact that, measured in size and in the number of personnel, the Finnish non-Big 
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Four audit firms are considerably smaller than Big Four audit firms, and the non-Big 
Four audit firms do not usually perform the audits of the Finnish listed companies. 
The positive correlation at a significant level between the answers to Questions 6 and 
22 would suggest that the respondent’s esteem of the solvency test in the asset distribu-
tion is related to whether one reports on these matters at all and, if yes, to the corporate 
body to which the respondent reports. On the basis of the answers it would seem that 
those respondents, who have appreciated the solvency test less, have made no reports on 
the solvency matters to corporate bodies in the context of the asset distribution. By con-
trast, those respondents, who have appreciated the solvency test highly, have made re-
ports to higher corporate bodies in the organisation. However, this result is weak but 
interesting, keeping in mind that similar written answers were given as additional com-
ments regarding Question 6. 
The answers to Questions 9 and 11 correlate positively at a statistically significant 
level. This would implicate that those respondents, who have paid attention to the doc-
uments that the audited company has established, also take notice of the financial indi-
cators or ratios of the company. Moreover, the answers to Questions 11 and 16 correlate 
negatively at a statistically significant level. It would seem that those respondents, who 
have paid attention to the financial indicators or ratios of the company, have been 
obliged to react on the evaluation of solvency fewer times in total. 
The answers to Questions 14 and 16 correlate negatively at a statistically significant 
level. Those respondents, who have been obliged to react on the audited company’s 
assessment on solvency, have done so only a certain number of times. On the other 
hand, Questions 14 and 17 correlate positively at a statistically very significant level. 
Those respondents, who have been obliged to react on the audited company’s assess-
ment on solvency, have done so also within the last 12 months preceding the answer. 
The answers to Questions 14 and Questions 21 and 22 correlate negatively at a statisti-
cally very significant level. This result could be interpreted that those respondents, who 
have been obliged to react on the audited company’s assessment on solvency, have re-
ported, if any, on the shortcomings in the evaluation of solvency in a statutory way and 
mainly to the board of directors and/or the CEO (cf. Appendix 2.1, Question 22: Mean 
3,22 and Median 4). However, those respondents who have answered in Question 14, 
that they have not been obliged to react on the company’s evaluation of solvency, seem 
to have answered in Question 19 that they do not report on these deficiencies. Together 
the answers are consistent and make perfectly sense. 
The answers to Questions 15 and 16 correlate positively at a statistically very signifi-
cant level. This result would suggest that when the more the respondent has been 
obliged to react in terms of absolute years, the more times one has been obliged to react. 
The answers to Questions 15 and 17 correlate negatively at a statistically very signifi-
cant level. That result would indicate that the more the respondent has been obliged to 
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react in terms of absolute years, the more likely it is that the respondent has reacted 
within the last 12 months preceding the answer. 
The answers to Questions 16 and 17 correlate negatively at a statistically very signif-
icant level. Those respondents who have answered that the more times the respondent 
has been obliged to react, the more likely is that the respondent has reacted within the 
last 12 months preceding the answer. The answers to Questions 16 and 18 correlate 
negatively at a statistically very significant level. This refers to that the more times the 
respondent has been obliged to react, the more likely is that the respondent has made 
some of those reactions in some specific situations. The answers to Questions 16 and 22 
correlate positively at a statistically very significant level. On the basis of the answers it 
would seem that those respondents, who have been obliged to react more times, have 
reported on the deficiencies to higher corporate bodies in the organisation. 
The answers to Questions 17 and 20 correlate negatively at a statistically significant 
level. This would suggest that those respondents, who have been obliged to react within 
the last 12 months preceding the answer, have made some reporting in various ways. By 
contrast, for those who have not been obliged to react within 12 months preceding the 
answer, the more likely it is that they have not reported on the evaluation of solvency 
matters at all. The answers to Questions 17 and 21 correlate negatively at a statistically 
very significant level, which would suggest that this tendency is highlighted where the 
report has bearing on shortcomings in the evaluation of solvency. Questions 17 and 22 
correlate negatively at a statistically significant level. This would suggest that those 
respondents, who have been obliged to react within the last 12 months preceding the 
answer, have made some reporting on the deficiencies to higher corporate bodies. By 
contrast, for those who have not been obliged to react within 12 months preceding the 
answer, the more likely it is that they have not reported on the shortcomings of in the 
evaluation of solvency matters at all to corporate bodies. 
The answers to Questions 20 and 21 correlate positively at a statistically very signifi-
cant level. This result reveals that those respondents, who have not made reports on the 
evaluation of solvency, have neither reported on their shortcomings. When these matters 
have been reported, it is very likely that those reports have discussed also shortcomings 
related thereto.  
The answers to Questions 21 and 22 correlate positively at a statistically very signifi-
cant level. This result uncovers the trite fact that those respondents who have not made 
reports on the shortcomings in the evaluation of solvency have neither directed such 
reports to any corporate body. By contrast, when these matters have been reported, it 
has been directed usually to the board of directors and/or the CEO (cf. Appendix 2.1, 




8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 General considerations regarding the study, solvency test and 
audit framework 
Study. The theme of this Master’s thesis has been the role of the auditor in the context 
of solvency test in asset distribution in Finland. The topic has been approached mainly 
from the point of view of a standard audit in accordance with the Finnish law and the 
ISAs. The approach has been task-based. I have proved that a duly planned, performed 
and reported standard audit in accordance with the applicable ISAs provides reliable 
financial information on solvency in the asset distribution and serves the execution of 
the solvency test, even where the auditor neither gives any specific opinion about it in 
the auditor’s report nor makes any specific assessment on the directors’ solvency report 
related to the asset distribution.  
I have gathered related secondary data from the existing audit, accounting and legal 
literature where, to my knowledge, such an extensive task-based coverage has not been 
made from this point of view. Further, to obtain first-hand primary data I have conduct-
ed an internet-based survey to the Finnish authorised auditors, mediated by FIAPA. 
 
Solvency test and corporate governance. The solvency test is based the national Finnish 
legislation. It is the duty of the management to execute the test before all the asset dis-
tributions (Government Bill 109/2005, 125). The test has proved difficult to interpret 
because the FCA and the Government Bill 109/2005 do not specify clearly what is 
meant by solvency. I have taken the view that the solvency test could be seen from a 
financial point of view and from a legal one. As to the financial point of view, the fi-
nancial position of a company consists of four main factors: growth rate of the compa-
ny, profitability, liquidity and solvency (Laitinen and Laitinen 2004, 261; Blummé et al. 
2010, 42−45). Each of these main factors can be evaluated on the basis of the financial 
statements that result also in key financial indicators or ratios. Excluding the growth 
rate, these factors are implicitly present in the Government Bill 109/2005 and more ex-
plicitly present in the relevant Finnish legal and audit literature, which refer to e.g. in-
come, equity, liabilities, and cash flow and solvency models. One theoretical problem is 
however, that these key financial figures, ratios and models may provide contradictory 
results. Another problem is that they do not necessarily fulfil the criterion of assessing 
solvency in the same terms ex ante and ex post (cf. Kähkönen 1998). Moreover, often 
the background assumptions of the various economic indicators supporting solvency 
analyses are not presented or their application to the solvency test of the FCA is not 
justified (Jokinen 2008, 96). The information should be relevant, precise and reliable. 
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The auditor should assess the solvency as a whole, but in practice both the manage-
ment and the auditors often work under stringent time pressures (See: Otley and Pierce 
1996), and it is likely that some selection of data has to be made. As to the legal point of 
view, the due care is of the essence. What is most problematic is that the company law 
aspect comprising directors and auditors’ due care has received very little consideration 
in theory (Jokinen 2008, 96). It seems that this is also the situation in practice as no ref-
erences, at least explicit ones, to the due care were made in the answers to the survey. 
From the point of view of the corporate governance, the board of directors acting as 
an agent shall act in the best interests of the company, acknowledge due care and loyalty 
(FCA Chapter 1, Section 5) to shareholders and creditors, who both are acting as the 
principals. This applies to the daily running of business, choice of applicable accounting 
standards and to the asset distribution. The board of directors shall find a balance be-
tween the conflicting interests of these principals (See, for example: Schleifer and Vish-
ny 1997 and Keay 2005). Due to the separation of ownership and control (See: Berle 
and Means 1932), the principals’ information about the efficiency of the agent is defi-
cient, and the principal is dependent on the information given, potentially limited and 
manipulated by the agent (Porter et al. 2008, 10−11; Arens et al. 2014, 27). The princi-
pals ask for reliable financial data. In this setting the auditors provide the needed assur-
ance service, if and when they succumb to the procedural requirements of due care and 
appropriate documentation. Therefore, the audit also is likely to decrease agency costs 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976, 323−324) even in the asset distribution. 
 
The scope and overall objectives of audit. In Finland, an audit covers the audit of the 
accounting records, the financial statements, the annual report and the administration of 
a company. In essence, the audit of administration seeks to assure the legality of the 
management’s decisions and actions including the due care (FAA Section 11).  
The overall objective of the auditor is to obtain reasonable assurance about whether 
the financial statements as a whole are free from material misstatement, whether due to 
fraud or error. The auditors shall reduce the risk of material misstatement to an accepta-
bly low level. The auditor shall express an opinion on whether the financial statements 
are prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with an applicable financial report-
ing framework. Moreover, the auditor should communicate one’s findings clearly (ISA 
200.11). Yet the auditor’s opinion neither assures that the company will remain viable 
nor that the management has acted efficiently in running the affairs of the company.  
In Finland, it is generally considered that one of the objectives of the financial state-
ments is to provide a calculus for the distributable amount of assets (Riistama 1999, 
151). Hence, it could be also argued that the task of the auditor is to provide more relia-
bility and legitimacy to the distribution of assets, even if the auditor cannot and is not 
expected to detect all the misstatements in the financial statements.  
80 
 
Financial statements, management’s assertions and auditor’s tasks. It is the duty of the 
management to organise business functions and internal controls in an efficient manner, 
to record transactions regarding at least sales, sourcing, inventory, payroll and finance 
in the IT systems in a correct and complete manner, and to apply relevant accounting 
principles, i.e. either Finnish Accounting Standards or the IFRS, in order to establish the 
financial statements (FCA Chapter 6, Sections 2, 17 and 21). The management explicit-
ly or implicitly makes assertions regarding the recognition, measurement, presentation 
and disclosure in the financial statements and related disclosures, e.g. occurrence, com-
pleteness, accuracy, cutoff, classification, existence, rights and obligations, valuation 
and allocation (ISA 315.A123−A125; Halonen and Steiner 2009, 269−270).  
It is the duty of the independent auditor (FAA Section 24) to take a stand whether the 
management’s assertions are duly applied (Porter et al. 2008, 3). General objectives 
may be set to the auditing of each statement of financial reporting (See: Riistama 1999, 
161−162 and 176−177). The auditor evaluates the application of management’s asser-
tions at the financial statement level and at the assertion level. Material misstatements at 
the financial statement level are usually so holistic and all-encompassing that the finan-
cial statements cannot be concluded to have been established in accordance with the 
applicable accounting standards (ISA 315.25; ISA 315.A120; Halonen and Steiner 
2009, 170−171). As a consequence, the distribution of assets can be seriously flawed 
due to a misstatement at the financial statement level or even at the assertion level and 
thus without a legal basis. If the financial statements are misrepresented only at the as-
sertion level, it is more likely that the misrepresentation can be corrected in a proper 
manner or, from the point of view of the asset distribution, it may not wholly prohibit it. 
If the auditor has a substantiated doubt that the management has breached its duties, e.g. 
it has proposed the asset distribution on the basis of the financial statements that include 
a material misstatement, the auditor shall make an explicit remark in the auditor’s report 
(FAA Section 15, Subsection 4). 
Auditor inevitably carries the audit risk, i.e. the risk that the auditor expresses an in-
appropriate audit opinion when the financial statements are materially misstated. The 
audit risk is a function of the detection risk and the risk of material misstatement includ-
ing inherent risk and control risk (ISA 200.13). To mitigate the audit risk, auditor shall 
make a thorough assessment of risks, perform tests of controls and substantive audit 
procedures and report in a due manner (See: Figure 3 and references therein). The audi-
tor shall exercise professional judgment and professional scepticism in planning and 
performing the audit. The inherent risk is higher for some assertions, classes of transac-
tions, account balances and disclosures than for others. It is elevated, for example, due 
to cash and liquid assets, large number of transactions, complexity of transactions, cal-
culations of value, accounting estimates, long-term projects, dispersed functions and 
increased influence of the management on a given assertion (Riistama 1999, 83−84; 
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Alakare et al. 2008, 61). In the same manner, the auditors assume differences in the risk 
levels of the internal controls regarding different functions (Halonen and Steiner 2009, 
136).  The efficiency of a given internal control affects the nature, extent and timing of 
the substantive audit procedures and the needed audit evidence (Arens et al. 2014, 280). 
However, the more material a certain factor, which affects the validity of the financial 
statements, is considered to be, the more that factor or business process undergoes effi-
cient audit procedures, and vice versa. When audit procedures concerning internal con-
trols, IT controls and business functions are performed and when they are functioning 
efficiently, the risk of material misstatement in the financial statements is reduced to an 
acceptably low level. Then also the level of audit risk is considered to be reduced (Hal-
onen and Steiner 2009, 49−50). The reliability of financial information that passes such 
a scrutiny is enhanced, and it is applicable as a basis for the distribution of assets. 
8.2 The audit process 
Risk assessment. The auditor shall comply with a certain audit process, which is gener-
ally divided into risk assessment phase, risk response phase and reporting phase. Each 
phase includes several subphases and methods.  
In the risk assessment phase the auditor obtains a basic understanding about compa-
ny, its business environment and its control environment, including the inherent risk and 
company’s internal controls that have a close relationship (Arens et al. 2014, 280). This 
enables the auditor to continuously understand the relevant risks of material misstate-
ment at the financial statement level and at the assertion level for classes of transactions, 
account balances and disclosures (ISA 315.3 and A1). The auditor should consider the 
underlying reasons for a given risk. Risk assessment provides a basis for setting materi-
ality levels, designing and implementing responses to the assessed risks of material mis-
statement, and deciding the appropriateness and sufficiency of the needed audit evi-
dence that are required for the audit to be carried out in compliance with the ISAs (ISA 
300.9; Halonen and Steiner 2009, 233; Riistama 1999, 77−79). The auditor performs 
risk assessment procedures through inquiries, analytical procedures and other proce-
dures, such as reviewing information obtained from external sources. The auditor 
should obtain understanding of corporate decision-making through the minutes, annexes 
and memorandums of meetings of the corporate bodies, of important contracts and 
background materials with regard to liability for the decision making process. The audi-
tor should also obtain information about pledges and collaterals and about share and 
shareholder registers (Riistama 1999, 248−249). 
On the basis of the survey conducted in this study, it seems that in the risk assess-
ment phase it is common for auditors to have considerations regarding solvency in the 
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asset distribution, as nearly half (23/53) of the respondents have responded to this effect 
in the survey (See: Question 7). It is obvious that the auditor should have a good under-
standing about where the company stands financially, what the relevant business risks 
and internal controls are, and where the company’s economy and finances are heading. 
The auditor should also try to obtain information about the capital needs of sharehold-
ers. An asset distribution should be assessed against this background. However, it is for 
the later studies to show how exactly solvency in the asset distribution is taken into ac-
count in the risk assessment phase by the auditor. 
 
Risk response. During the risk response phase the auditor implements the planned audit 
procedures to address the assessed risks of material misstatement at the financial state-
ment level and at the assertion level (ISA 330.6). The audit procedures are a combina-
tion of tests of control and substantive procedures including tests of details and substan-
tive analytical procedures (ISA 330.4). The identified significant risks, which are likely 
to relate to e.g. debt and equity transactions, always call for substantive audit procedures 
that are specifically responsive to that risk, often tests of details (ISA 330.21 and A53). 
The auditor shall also pay attention to the unpredictability of audit procedures to counter 
the possibility of the management to override controls (ISA 330.18 and 42). 
The auditor’s understanding of the control environment is crucial to the assessment 
of the risks of material misstatement and thereby the auditor’s overall responses. 
Properly planned, organised and applied internal controls reduce inherent risks: factors 
that usually improve the control are good organisation of internal control, broad and 
extended budget control, the management’s engagement in analysing budgetary differ-
ence and acting consequently, continuous development of the accounting system, and 
efficient decision-making in matters having a material effect on business and the finan-
cial statements. An effective control environment may allow the auditor to have more 
confidence in the internal control and the reliability of the audit evidence. High assessed 
risk level or deficiencies in the control environment, such as unrestricted authority of 
the management to meddle into virtually any activity in the company or the lack of re-
sponsible persons’ time, deputy persons or documentation, may force the auditor to per-
form more tests of controls and/or substantive procedures to obtain more extensive audit 
evidence and/or to increase the extent of the previously performed audit procedures 
(ISA 315.14 and A78−82; ISA 330.A2; Riistama 1999, 85−86 and 91−92).  
With a view to the asset distribution, the internal controls of the accounting function 
and finance function are especially important. Therefore, the auditor should assure, inter 
alia, that the automated controls have not undergone unauthorised amendments nor 
been overridden by the management. A considerable number of companies’ transactions 
are initiated, recorded, processed, reported and stored electronically only. Therefore, the 
effective operation of the IT system and controls affects directly the validity, appropri-
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ateness and completeness of the audit evidence (ISA 315.A140−A141; Halonen and 
Steiner 2009, 175 and 240). Moreover, the auditor should assure that human controls 
work effectively. First, the personnel involved in dealing with the cash flows should not 
involve in dealing with accounting or subledgers (separation of duties). This is not, 
however, possible in small companies that constitute the majority of the Finnish limited 
liability companies, but instead information technology, user restrictions and other in-
ternal controls should be used to the same end in these companies. Second, the auditor 
shall also see to that the board of directors has authorised material debt transactions and 
the general meeting has authorised equity transactions (authorisation). These transac-
tions must be appropriately documented (audit trail) and their recording duly instructed 
(Riistama 1999, 92−94; Arens et al. 2014, 316−317; ISA 315, Appendix 1, Paragraphs 9 
and 10). The tests of controls are typically performed during the entire period (ISA 
330.11 and A11; Halonen and Steiner 2009, 237). The higher the assessed risk, the 
more audit evidence is needed. 
The audit of the financial statements is a cumulative and iterative process. Some au-
dit procedures provide more reliable audit evidence in relation to some risks or asser-
tions than others.  Usually the tests of control and the substantive procedures are di-
rected to a certain object simultaneously. Their evidence may relate to the application of 
the controls at relevant times, the consistency of application, the personalities using the 
controls, or to means of application (ISA 330.10 (a)). After the tests of controls, the 
auditor shall make an assessment on whether one relies on those controls or not. If the 
auditor concludes that relevant internal controls are not operating effectively or if signif-
icant deviations are detected, the auditor shall make further inquiries and observations, 
and determine whether the performed tests of controls provide an appropriate basis for 
relying on those controls and whether additional tests of controls and/or substantive 
procedures are necessary (ISA 330.16−17; Halonen and Steiner 2009, 57 and 233). The 
auditor may need to modify the nature, timing or extent of other planned audit proce-
dures (ISA 330.25 and A60). The necessary extent of an audit procedure can be in-
creased only if the audit procedure in question is relevant to the specific risk involved 
(ISA 330.A15). 
The auditor shall design and perform substantive procedures for each material class 
of transactions, account balance, and disclosure. These include in-depth inspection of 
the said objects (tests of details). The substantive procedures may also relate to the clos-
ing process of the financial statements. Moreover, the substantive procedures include 
external confirmation procedures that are effective in addressing assertions associated 
with account balances, collaterals, their elements and the terms of agreements, contracts 
or transactions (ISA 330.19 and A48). They may produce valuable pieces of basic in-
formation for the analysis on the sufficiency of assets in relation to known liabilities. 
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As to the finance function and cash management, that are important for the asset dis-
tribution, the auditor shall assure that all the cash and other liquid assets exist because 
they are the most susceptible to be embezzled. The auditor shall also evaluate whether 
the management of material amounts of money is effective (Riistama 1999, 83−84 and 
92−94). The audit of debt management consists of verifying applicable corporate prin-
ciples and procedures regarding short and long term credit as well as collaterals. Also, 
the external confirmations of balances shall be verified. Moreover, subordinated loans, 
their conformity with the conditions provided for in the FCA and recording in the bal-
ance sheet statement shall be audited. The audit of equity management covers share 
capital, mandatory and voluntary reserves and other eventual investments of equity. At 
least in minor companies it also covers share capital information entered into the share 
register. The number of the transactions is usually low but their nominal value can be 
significant. Therefore, the risks involved with these transactions are usually considered 
material (Riistama 1999, 194−195 and 200−202; Halonen and Steiner 2009, 382−383), 
and they should be subject to particular attention. With a view to the asset distribution, 
it is advisable to audit the entire population of transactions of liabilities and equity. Also 
the conformity of the amount of the asset distribution with the authorisation and the 
decision of the general meeting shall be verified afterwards. 
Analytical procedures are generally applicable to predictable and large volumes of 
transactions (ISA 330.A44), but their pertinence is closely related to the nature of asser-
tion and risk, to the efficiency of internal controls and also to the quality of the data 
used, i.e. whether data is obtained from the audited company or outside it. Analytical 
procedures are evaluations of financial information through analysis of plausible rela-
tionships among both financial and non-financial data (ISA 520.A6), varying from sim-
ple comparisons to complex analyses. For example, a company’s current financial in-
formation could be compared with comparable information for prior financial periods, 
anticipated results of the company or its competitor(s), expectations of the auditor or 
general predictable patterns (ISA 520.A1−A3). The auditor shall evaluate the suitability, 
reliability and precision of analytical procedures for given assertions. The auditor must 
determine the acceptable amount of difference between recorded and expected values 
(ISA 520.5). The riskier the item is, the lower the accepted difference is (ISA 520.A16). 
Analytical procedures assist the auditor to form an overall conclusion as to whether 
the financial statements are consistent with the auditor’s understanding (ISA 330.22). It 
is evident that the analytical procedures can be useful in assessing the application of the 
going concern assumption or the solvency in the asset distribution. In the latter context, 
the auditor takes advantage of key financial ratios and considers the cost-revenue struc-
ture of the company. The auditor should try to find reasons in the real process for 
changes in those results (Riistama 1999, 174−179). Different key financial figures or 
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ratios or solvency models described in the legal and accounting literature are applicable, 
taken into account their background assumptions, validity, relevance and reliability.  
Due to high risk and relation to the closing process of the financial statements, sol-
vency-related transactions and the distributable amount itself can be assessed reliably 
only after the establishment of the financial statements (cf. ISA 330.7, A6, A11 and 
A13 and Halonen and Steiner 2009, 237). In addition, by the end of the audit the auditor 
shall have recognised related parties and audited the related party transactions through 
which undercover directed asset distribution may be effected. To this end, the auditor 
shall make inquiries within and outside the company, classify unusual transactions and 
examine the relevant underlying agreements (ISA 550.13 and 23). 
 
Going concern analysis and asset distribution. The auditors are used to making an anal-
ysis on the use of the going concern assumption while analysing the financial situation 
of the company. Under the going concern assumption, a company is considered to con-
tinue running its business operations for the foreseeable future (ISA 570.2). Assets and 
liabilities are recorded assuming that the company will be able to realise its assets and 
discharge its liabilities in the normal course of business. However, the auditor may have 
reasons to doubt the use of going concern assumption on the basis of important negative 
events, e.g. the operative result is seriously in the deficit, the liabilities or claims exceed 
the assets, or due bills cannot be paid timely. The auditor shall actively monitor whether 
or not such negative signals exist and whether the management has an emergency plan 
in case such negative signals occur (Riistama 1999, 155−157).  
In making this analysis, the auditor shall also evaluate the validity of the manage-
ment’s going concern assessment, which should cover at least 12 months or a longer 
period equivalent to the management’s preliminary assessment if it exists. If such events 
or conditions have been identified that the application of the going concern assumption 
may be inappropriate, the auditor shall obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence to 
determine whether or not a material uncertainty exists (ISA 570.6 and 10−12). The au-
ditor may further analyse and discuss the latest available interim financial statements 
and forecasts, read the terms of financial agreements and minutes of the meetings of the 
relevant governing bodies and confirm whether financial support is available (ISA 
570.16−17 and A15). 
Regarding the evaluation of the solvency in the asset distribution, there are neither 
explicit provisions nor a recommendation on what auditors should do. The auditors are 
relying mutatis mutandis on ISA 570 (cf. Troberg 2009; Markkola 2009; Markkola and 
Sutinen 2011a and 2011b) and good auditing practice, which includes the relevant prin-
ciples (e.g. independence, objectivity, integrity, due care) and audit methods. The going 
concern assumption may well be used unless there is clear evidence to the contrary, that 
is, the management either intends to liquidate the company, to cease its operations, or 
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has no other realistic alternative. However, there are some differences. In the solvency 
test (cf. FCA Chapter 13, Section 2) there is no 12 months limit to which the auditors 
seem to limit their solvency assessment (Question 4). In some specific companies the 
time period of the solvency test may be more extensive than 12 months. Also the per-
formance of additional analytical procedures is advisable to support the results of the 
adjusted going concern analysis. The auditors commonly use audit procedures and eval-
uate the use of going concern assumption, but it is for the later studies to expand our 
knowledge of how exactly solvency in the asset distribution is taken into account in the 
risk response phase. 
 
Reporting. The purpose of the audit is to enhance the users’ confidence in the financial 
statements by mitigating the opportunities of the management to biased reporting (ISA 
200.3; See also: Porter et al. 2008, 10 and Arens et al. 2014, 27). To this end, the auditor 
evaluates the sufficiency and appropriateness of the obtained audit evidence (ISA 
330.25−26) and communicates one’s findings in an active manner orally and in writing 
to the corporate bodies of the audited company (ISA 260.4−5, 15−17 and A20) and in 
the auditor’s report to the public. In the auditor’s report the auditor expresses an opinion 
on whether the financial statements are prepared, in all material respects, in accordance 
with an applicable financial reporting framework. The auditor’s opinion shall be unqual-
ified, qualified or adverse. In certain circumstances auditor shall disclaim an opinion 
(See: ISA 700). The auditor’s report may also include a separate Emphasis of Matter 
paragraph, e.g. when the auditor has significant doubts on the applicability of the going 
concern principle or otherwise uncertain events may have occurred that are pervasive 
but do not necessitate a qualified or adverse opinion (Government Bill 194/2006, 39; 
Alakare et al. 2008, 79). The auditor shall submit the auditor’s report to the manage-
ment (FAA Section 15, Subsection 5), and this important to enable the shareholders’ 
effective decision-making in the general meeting (FCA Chapter 5, Section 3, Subsection 
1, Point 2). Last, the auditor shall archive the audit documentation (Halonen and Steiner 
2009, 59 and 442−443). 
It is a national requirement in Finland that the auditor shall make a remark in the au-
ditor’s report if a shareholder, the management or any other accountable person in the 
corporation 1) is guilty of an act or negligence which may result in liability in damages 
towards the company, or 2) has violated a law applicable to the company, or the articles 
of association, deed of partnership, or bylaws of the company (FAA Section 15, Subsec-
tion 4). The auditor must take into account the materiality principle such that a minor 
breach does not cause a remark. The auditor shall justify the remark, in practice on the 
basis of the audit evidence obtained during the audit (Government Bill 194/2006, 40).  
According to the current FCA, the annual general meeting does not usually have the 
auditor’s statement on the distribution of assets. Therefore, in a normal situation where 
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no offence has been committed, the auditor gives one’s implicit opinion on that the asset 
distribution can be made. As the remark is omitted, the auditor considers the proposal 
for the distribution of assets to be legal (Mähönen and Villa 2010, 422). On the other 
hand, the auditor’s report includes a remark, where necessary. Such a situation occurs, 
for example, when the auditor finds out that the board of directors’ proposal for an asset 
distribution is in contradiction with the solvency test or the balance sheet test or with the 
articles of association (Government Bill 194/2006, 38 and 40). Such a situation might 
occur also where the auditor has ascertained that the related party relationships and 
transactions are not duly identified, accounted for and disclosed in the financial state-
ments (cf. ISA 550). 
However, the auditor may agree with the board of directors or, where applicable, the 
audit committee that the auditor establishes an expressive statement on the matter in all 
situations. The company’s articles of association may also contain a stipulation to that 
effect. The audit committee, general meeting or unanimous shareholders may ask the 
auditor to establish such a statement, and complying with such a demand is considered 
to be in accordance with the good auditing practice (FAA Section 19, Subsection 3 and 
Section 22, Subsection 2; ISA 700.38; Auditor Board of the State 1/2009, given out 31 
August 2009). 
The auditor may also use non-public means of communicating to the management 
deficiencies that do not necessitate a paragraph or a remark in the auditor’s report. In 
particular, oral communication, inspection reports and in some specific events audit 
memorandum could be used for the purpose of mediating the auditor’s view on the asset 
distribution. For the auditor’s personal use only the audit working papers might include 
a calculus for the solvency test and other related notes. 
8.3 The survey 
In the survey conducted to obtain evidence for this study, the Finnish auditors were 
asked en masse for the first time what they think about the subject matter. The majority 
of the respondents had worked more than 10 years as an authorised auditor, and the ma-
jority of the respondents did not work in a so-called Big Four audit firm. The respond-
ents audited mainly small and medium-sized companies.  
The majority of the respondents (43/53) agreed or completely agreed with the state-
ment that auditing the evaluation of solvency by audited company in the context of the 
asset distribution is important. The rest of the respondents were equally distributed 
among the other options (completely disagree, disagree, neutral). The responses prove, 
however, that the audited companies seldom set up a documented solvency assessment. 
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As to the definition of solvency in the context of asset distribution, five qualitative 
categories and one combination category could be distinguished. The absolute majority 
of the respondents (32/47) stated that the solvency in asset distribution refers to that the 
company is able to discharge itself of the decided asset distribution and of its liabilities 
to the creditors. Also certain calculation formulas, financial ratios and solvency models 
have been presented (7/47). Also some items in the financial statements (3/47) and pos-
sibilities to obtaining finance (2/47) have been mentioned. Some respondents have pre-
sented general principles for the definition of solvency. In the last sixth category differ-
ent combinations of the former categories were given. However, it is noteworthy that 
many respondents limited their assessment to 12 months at most, and no reference to the 
management’s duty of care was made. 
The answers to the survey prove that the solvency has been taken into account in all 
the phases of the audit. Yet, its pervasiveness has varied considerably depending on the 
phase, and it has been at its highest when the audit of administration has been per-
formed. It seems to have been often present also in the planning, analytical procedures 
and reporting phases. The fact that solvency has been ubiquitous in the audit may be 
due to that ISA 570 “Going Concern” is applicable during the whole audit process. It is 
then natural for the auditor to have paid attention to the solvency from the beginning to 
the end of the audit process. However, it would seem that considerations that have been 
made during the audit process complement each other, as the audit process is cumula-
tive and iterative. 
With a view to the solvency test in the asset distribution, the auditors have mostly 
looked at the income statement (39/52) and the balance sheet (49/52). It is worth noting 
that other documents established by the companies and key financial ratios, especially 
equity ratio and the relative indebtedness, have also been studied. Hence, the auditors 
seem to have acted as the literature suggests in that they have not limited their evalua-
tion to the financial statements only, even if they may have had serious time budget 
pressures. 
The answers to the survey reflect the fact that it seems to have been rather common 
for the auditors react to the shortcomings in the management’s assessment of solvency. 
In essence, more than half of the respondents (30/53) have been obliged to react since 
the entry into force of the FCA, which took place on 1 September 2006. Even if the re-
sults of Question 16 are somewhat inconsistent with those of Question 14, it would 
seem that the most of the respondents have had to react to inadequate assessments of 
solvency during two years and 1-10 times in total. It would also seem that the human 
part of the auditors’ position has come into the picture, as some of the respondents have 
considered that a single event of the asset distribution could never lead the company to 




Question 18 on the specific situations was formed to test the findings of Lehtimäki 
(2010) who found out that asset distributions are often related to some specific situa-
tions. These situations were given as answer options in Question 18. According to the 
answers to the survey, in 3 distribution-related situations there has been involved an 
audit of a group, and in 5 situations a company restructuration. In 11 situations there 
was other event occurring, e.g. where the tax liability of the audited company amounted 
to more the amount of distributable assets or the dividend was paid throughout the fi-
nancial year. Therefore, the answers of my study have given some support to the find-
ings of Lehtimäki. An execution of an asset distribution may be attempted in situations 
where the viability of the company and the interests of the creditors are at stake or even 
without any assessment on the solvency. It is in these situations in particular where the 
auditors must remain alert and employ professional scepticism and judgement.  
The objective of the survey was also to find out how the auditors have reacted to the 
shortcomings of the management’s solvency assessments. Even if the results of Ques-
tion 19 are somewhat inconsistent with those of Question 17, it would seem that approx-
imately half of the respondents have encouraged the audited company to establish one 
or more documents. The rest options (demand for more documentation that has already 
existed; perform more procedures; give a qualified or adverse auditor’s report; and in 
other way, which, explain in the end of the questionnaire) have also been met in prac-
tice. As one example that has been often mentioned, some respondents have stated that 
the audited companies have postponed the decisions on the asset distributions or the 
execution of such decision after the auditor has discussed with the board of directors. 
This seems to be a current practice in the small and medium-sized companies. 
As to the reporting, the majority of the respondents (41/53) have reported on short-
comings of solvency, mostly orally and mostly to the board of directors or the audit 
committee and the chief executive officer. Nevertheless, various ways of reporting in 
writing (in audit minutes; in auditor’s report; in other way, which, explain in the end of 
the questionnaire) also take place. It should be highlighted, too, that a considerable 
number of the respondents (13/53) have not reported on shortcomings to any corporate 
body. 
As to the correlations, some topics could be brought up. First, a weak but interesting 
positive correlation at a significant level was found between the answers to Questions 6 
and 22 in the survey. It seems that the auditor’s attitudes on the solvency test in general 
have played a role with regard to reporting to corporate bodies. The result would sug-
gest that the respondent’s esteem of the solvency test in the asset distribution is related 
to whether one reports at all and, if yes, to the corporate body to which the respondent 
reports. Second, the answers to Questions 9 and 11 correlate positively at a statistically 
significant level. It is rather obvious that that those respondents, who have paid attention 
to the documents that the audited company has established, also take notice of the fi-
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nancial indicators or ratios of the company. However, on the basis of the negative corre-
lation (value: -0,41) at a statistically significant level for the answers to Questions 11 
and 16, it would seem that those respondents, who have paid attention to the financial 
indicators or ratios of the company, have been obliged to react on the evaluation of sol-
vency fewer times in total. This correlation of this significance seems to apply to finan-
cial indicators or ratios only, but not to the various parts of financial statements in Ques-
tion 9 (cf. correlation value between Question 9 and 16: -0,18). This result would impli-
cate that the financial indicators or ratios might have more relevance than the financial 
statements in analysing solvency in the context of the asset distribution.  
Moreover, cohorts of easily explained correlations were found. For example, if the 
respondent has not reacted on the evaluation of solvency by the audited company, one 
has not done so within the last 12 months preceding the answer either, nor reported on 
its shortcomings or directed such report to the corporate bodies. In a similar fashion, the 
more times the respondent has been obliged to react on the evaluation of solvency by 
the audited company, the more likely one has reacted in many years and within the last 
12 months preceding the answer, communicated on the solvency matter in general and 
in particular on its shortcomings, and directed the oral communication or written reports 
to corporate bodies.  
8.4 Limitations of the study 
There are a number of limitations related to the survey. First, even if FIAPA was kindly 
mediating the access link to the survey, apart from that there was no control of the re-
spondents. However, the quality of the answers suggests that the respondents have been 
auditors. Second, there are about 1400 members in FIAPA but only 53 responses were 
received. Hence, the number of respondents remained at a low level, even if it is the 
most extensive data collected to date on this topic. The low number of respondents ren-
ders the statistical results weak, but nevertheless the results shed light on how the audi-
tors have performed their duties in practice. Those results are supported by written de-
scriptions of the auditors in the open space for further information. Third, the majority 
of the respondents audit small and medium-sized companies. Therefore the answer may 
not depict the situation accurately with regard to the biggest audited companies. Some 
respondents even stated in the open space that the small and biggest companies function 
in different business worlds.  
That said, the quality of the responses reflects a good knowledge of the subject mat-
ter and the audit process. Therefore I have reasons to believe that the view given by the 
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Tilintarkastajan asema ja tehtävät varojenjakoon liittyvän maksukykytestin yh-
teydessä (kyselyssä ei käsitellä yleistä going concern -arviota) 
 
Kyselyn tarkoituksena on selvittää laaja-alaisesti varojenjaon maksukykytestiin liittyviä 
yksittäisten tilintarkastajien kokemuksia. Tämän vuoksi tämä kysely lähetetään KHT-
yhdistys ry:n välityksellä niiden jäsenille.  
 
Kysely on suomenkielinen, mutta kysymykset on käännetty englanniksi. Voitte vastata 
suomeksi, ruotsiksi tai englanniksi. Kirjoitan tutkielmani englanniksi. 
 
Pyydän Teitä vastaamaan kyselyn kysymyksiin. Vastaaminen kestää arviolta 15–30 
minuuttia. 
 
Vastauksianne käytetään anonyymisti maisterinopintojen tutkielmassani ja voidaan 
käyttää anonyymisti mahdollisissa jatko-opinnoissani. 
 
(The role and tasks of the auditor in the context of the solvency test in the distribu-
tion of assets (the survey is not about general going concern assessment) 
 
The aim of the survey is to find out extensively the experiences of auditors with regard 
to the solvency test in the distribution of assets. For this reason, this survey is mediated 
by FIAPA to its members. 
 
The survey is in Finnish, but the questions have been translated to English. You may 
answer in Finnish, Swedish or English. I will write my master’s thesis in English. 
 
I ask You to answer the questions of the survey. It will take approximately 15-30 
minutes. 
 
Your answers will be used in anonym in my master’s thesis and they can be used in 




I: Kuvailevat kysymykset  
(Descriptive questions) 
 
1. Kuinka monta vuotta olette toiminut HTM- tai KHT-tilintarkastajana? 
(How many years have you been working as an authorised auditor?) * 
 Alle 3 vuotta (less than 3 years) 
 3-5 vuotta (3-5 years) 
 6-8 vuotta (6-8 years) 
 8-10 vuotta (8-10 years) 
 Yli 10 vuotta (more than 10 years) 
 
2. Toimitteko tällä hetkellä tilintarkastajana ns. Big Four -tilintarkastusyhteisössä?  
(Do you work as an authorised auditor in a so-called Big Four audit firm?) * 
 Kyllä (Yes) 
 Ei (No) 
 
3. Tilintarkastajat voivat käyttää tilintarkastukseen suunnitellun tuntimäärän eri tavoin; 
joku voi käyttää nuo tunnit yhteen suureen yhtiöön, toinen samat tunnit moneen pie-
neen yhtiöön. Ottaen huomioon yhtiön tilintarkastukseen käyttämienne tuntien määrä 
ja niiden suunniteltu yhteismäärä, minkä kokoisten yhtiöiden tilintarkastamiseen käy-
tätte eniten tunteja yhteismäärästänne, ts. minkä kokoisia yhtiöitä pääsääntöisesti ti-
lintarkastatte (vastauksen luvut viittaavat liikevaihtoon)? 
 
(Auditors may use their budgeted audit hours in different ways; one may consume 
those hours to one big company, another may consume the same hours to many small 
companies. Taking into account hours used on a company and your total budgeted 
hours, to the audit of which companies you consume most of the total budgeted 
hours, that is, what sized companies do you usually audit (the numbers in the answers 
refer to revenue) ?) * 
 Alle 200 000 € (less than 200 000 €) 
 200 000 – 999 999 € 
 1 000 000 – 9 999 999 € 
 10 000 000 – 49 999 999 € 
 Vähintään 50 000 000 € (at least 50 000 000 €) 
II: Maksukyvyn määrittely, maksukykyarvioiden yleisyys sekä arvioinnin tärkeys  
(Definition of solvency, occurrence of solvency assessment and Importance of analysing sol-
vency) 
 
4. Miten ymmärrätte ja määrittelette varojenjaossa vaadittavan maksukyvyn, lyhyt avoin 
vastaus?  
(How do you understand and define the solvency needed in the asset distribution, 




5. Miten yleistä on, että varojenjaon yhteydessä tilintarkastusasiakas on laatinut doku-
mentoidun maksukykyä koskevan arvion, mitattuna prosentteina varojenjakotilanteis-
ta?  
(How common is it that the audit client has established a documented assessment on 
solvency in the context of a distribution of assets, measured as a percentage of asset 
distribution events?) *    
 0 % 
 1-25 % 
 26-50 % 
 51-75 % 
 76-100 % 
 
 
6. Pidän tilintarkastettavan yhtiön maksukyvyn arvioinnin tarkastamista tärkeänä osana 
tilintarkastajan tehtäviä: täysin eri mieltä = 1, täysin samaa mieltä = 5. 
(I consider auditing the evaluation of solvency by audited company an important part 






III.A: Maksukyvyn arvioinnin tarkastus käytännössä  
(Auditing the evaluation of solvency in practice) 
 
7. Otatteko tilintarkastettavan yhtiön maksukyvyn ja sen arvioinnin varojenjaossa huo-
mioon tilintarkastuksessa? 
(In audit, do you take into account the solvency of the audited company and its evalua-
tion in the asset distribution): * 
a. Kyllä, tilintarkastuksen suunnittelussa (yes, in planning theaudit) 
b. Kyllä, kontrolleja tarkastettaessa (yes, in the tests of controls) 
c. Kyllä, sisällöllisiä aineistotarkastustoimenpiteitä suoritettaessa (yes, in perfor-
ming substantive procedures) 
d. Kyllä, analyyttisiä tarkastustoimenpiteitä suoritettaessa (yes, in performing 
analytical procedures) 
e. Kyllä, yhtiön hallinnon tarkastusta suoritettaessa (yes, in auditing the govern-
ance of the company) 
f. Kyllä, raportointivaiheessa (yes, in the reporting phase) 
g. Ei (no). 
 
 
8. Jos vastasitte myöntävästi yhteen tai useampaan edellisen kysymyksen vaihtoehdoista, 
miten otatte huomioon tilintarkastettavan yhtiön maksukyvyn ja sen arvioinnin varo-
jenjaossa, lyhyt avoin vastaus? 
103 
 
(If you answered affirmatively in any of the options of the previous question, how do 
you take into account the solvency of the audited company and its evaluation in such 
cases, short open-ended answer?) 
III.B: Dokumentaatio  
(Documentation) 
 
9. Kiinnitättekö huomiota tilintarkastettavan yhtiön tuottamiin asiakirjoihin maksukyvyn 
arvioinnin tarkastuksen yhteydessä?  
(When auditing the evaluation of solvency, do you pay attention to the documents 
that the audited company has made?) * 
 Kyllä, aina (Yes, always) 
 Kyllä, toisinaan (Yes, sometimes) 
 Ei koskaan (Never) 
 
10. Jos kiinnitätte huomiota, mihin asiakirjoihin?  
(If you pay attention to such documents, which ones?) 
 tuloslaskelma (income statement) 
 tase (balance sheet) 
 rahoituslaskelma (cash flow statement) 
 toimintakertomus (management report) 
 johdon laatimat budjetit (budgets by the management) 
 johdon laatimat kassavirtalaskelmat (cash flow budgets by the management) 
 muu, mikä, selvennä kyselyn lopussa (other, which, explain in the end of the 
questionnaire) 
 
11. Kiinnitättekö huomiota tilintarkastettavan yhtiön taloudellista asemaa kuvaaviin tun-
nuslukuihin maksukyvyn arvioinnin tarkastuksen yhteydessä?  
(When auditing the evaluation of solvency, do you pay attention to the financial indi-
cators or ratios characterising the financial position of the audited company?) * 
 Kyllä, aina (Yes, always) 
 Kyllä, toisinaan (Yes, sometimes) 
 Ei koskaan (Never) 
 
12. Jos kiinnitätte huomiota, mihin tunnuslukuihin?  
(If you pay attention to such indicators or ratios, which ones?) 
 pääoman tuottoa kuvaavat tunnusluvut (return on assets/investments) 
 nettotulosprosentti (net profit ratio) 
 omavaraisuusaste (equity ratio) 
 suhteellinen velkaantuneisuus (relative indebtedness) 






13. Jos ette kiinnitä huomiota tilintarkastettavan yhtiön tuottamiin asiakirjoihin ettekä 
tunnuslukuihin, mihin asioihin kiinnitätte huomiota, lyhyt avoin vastaus?  
(If you pay attention neither to the documents that the audited company has made 
nor to the financial indicators and ratios, to which matters do you pay attention, short 
open-ended answer?) 
III.C: Maksukyvyn arviointiin reagointi  
(Reacting on the evaluation of solvency) 
 
14. Oletteko ollut tilanteessa, että tilintarkastettavan yhtiön maksukyvyn arviointi on kat-
sottu siinä määrin riittämättömäksi, että olette tavalla tai toisella joutunut reagoimaan 
maksukyvyn arviointiin uuden osakeyhtiölain voimassa olon aikana 
(Have you been in a situation where the evaluation of solvency by the audited compa-
ny has been deemed inadequate to a degree that, in one way or another, you have 
been obliged to react on the evaluation of solvency, under the new Finnish Limited Li-
ability Companies Act)? * 
 Kyllä (Yes) 
 Ei (No) 
 
15. Jos vastasitte edelliseen kysymykseen Kyllä, kuinka monena vuonna olette joutunut 
reagoimaan maksukyvyn arviointiin?  
(If you answered Yes to the previous question, in how many years you have been 





 vähintään 5 vuotena (at least in 5 years) 
 
16. Kuinka monta kertaa yhteensä olette joutunut reagoimaan maksukyvyn arviointiin uu-
den osakeyhtiölain voimassa olon aikana?  
(How many times have you been obliged to react on the evaluation of solvency alto-





 yli 30 kertaa (more than 30 times). 
 
17. Oletteko joutunut tavalla tai toisella joutunut reagoimaan tilintarkastettavan yhtiön 
maksukyvyn arviointiin varojenjaossa viimeisten 12 kuukauden aikana?  
(Have you, in one way or another, been obliged to react on the evaluation of solvency 
by the audited company in the asset distribution context during the last 12 months?) * 
 Kyllä (Yes) 




18. Jos vastasitte edelliseen kysymykseen Kyllä, oliko kyse jostakin erityistilanteesta, ku-
ten:  
(If you answered Yes to the previous question, was there a specific situation involved, 
such as:) 
 Konsernin tilintarkastus (an audit of a group) 
 Epäselvä omistusrakenne (an unclear ownership structure) 
 Yrityssaneeraus (a company restructuration) 
 Konkurssi (a bankruptcy) 
 muu, mikä, selvennä kyselyn lopussa (other, which, explain in the end of the 
questionnaire) 
 
19. Mitä toimenpiteitä olette tehnyt, kun olette reagoinut maksukyvyn arviointiin?  
(Which measures have you taken when you have you reacted on the evaluation of sol-
vency?) 
 Kehottanut tilintarkastettavaa yhtiötä laatimaan jonkin tai joitakin asiakirjoja 
(encouraged the audited company to establish one or more documents) 
 Vaatinut lisää jo olemassa ollutta dokumentaatiota (demanded more docu-
mentation that has already been existing) 
 Suorittanut lisää tarkastustoimenpiteitä (performed more procedures) 
 Kirjoittanut ehdollisen tai kielteisen tilintarkastuskertomuksen (written a quali-
fied or adverse auditor’s report) 
 Muulla tavoin, miten, selvennä kysymyksen lopussa (in other way, which, ex-
plain in the end of the questionnaire) 
 
III.D: Maksukyvyn arvioinnin tarkastuksen raportointi  
(Reporting the audit of the evaluation of solvency) 
 
20. Millä tavoin ja millä tasolla olette yleensä raportoinut tilintarkastettavan yhtiön mak-
sukyvyn arviointiin liittyvistä seikoista?  
(In which way and at which level have you, in general, reported on the evaluation of 
solvency by the audited company?) * 
 Ei raportointia näistä asioista (No reporting on these matters) 
 Suullisesti (orally) 
 Tilintarkastuspöytäkirjassa (in audit minutes) 
 Tilintarkastuskertomuksessa (in auditor’s report) 
 Muulla tavoin, miten (in other way, which)  
 
21. Millä tavoin ja millä tasolla olette raportoinut tilintarkastettavan yhtiön maksukyvyn 
arviointiin liittyvistä puutteista?  
(In which way and at which level have you reported on the shortcomings in the evalua-





 Ei raportointia näistä asioista (No reporting on these matters) 
 Suullisesti (orally) 
 Tilintarkastuspöytäkirjassa (in audit minutes) 
 Tilintarkastuskertomuksessa (in auditor’s report) 
 Muulla tavoin, miten, selvennä kyselyn lopussa (in other way, which, explain in 
the end of the questionnaire)  
 
22. Kenelle olette raportoinut tilintarkastettavan yhtiön maksukyvyn arviointiin liittyvistä 
puutteista?  
(To whom have you reported on the shortcomings in the evaluation of solvency by the 
audited company)? 
 Ei raportointia näistä asioista (No reporting on these matters)  
 Vain hallitukselle tai tarkastusvaliokunnalle (to the board of directors or audit 
committee only) 
 Vain toimitusjohtajalle (to the CEO only) 
 Hallitukselle tai tarkastusvaliokunnalle sekä toimitusjohtajalle (to the board of 
directors or the audit committee and the CEO) 
 Yhtiökokoukselle (to the general meeting) 
 
IV: Muut kommentit  
(Other comments) 
 
23. Olkaa hyvä ja kirjoittakaa muut aiheeseen liittyvät kommenttinne.  
(Please write your other topic-related comments.) 
 
 Vahvista vastausten lähetys (Confirm sending the answers) 
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2.2 General correlations and statistical significance (calculated by Webropol) 
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